The foundations of the separation of powers principle and those of antitrust present an actual and renewed interest, as we are currently witnessing a resurgence of non-economic concerns in the antitrust literature. This observation especially relates to the United States, but many issues raised in this country are also relevant in other jurisdictions. Several key provisions of antitrust national laws or European treaties are rather vague, leaving broad room for interpretation, and have remained unchanged in substance for decades, which may open a connection between the political content of antitrust viewed historically and prospectively; to a certain extent, the ball is now in the court of agencies and courts. The concentration of power in the digital era constitutes the starting point of the analysis, which continues with the observation that some digital platforms have significant political power and ends with the idea that such platforms have become important or even fundamental parts of the digital infrastructure of democracy.

The separation of powers principle and antitrust both relate to power – a multidimensional, multifactorial, contextual, and evolutive notion – and notably deal with the concentration or the abuse of power. The separation of powers principle primarily relates to the branches of government and state functions. For its part, antitrust is linked to economic power.

Chapter 22 reviews how market-based thinking has come to dominate our value system, and how the overconcentration of power may negatively influence the rate at which we can make progress. For example, as neoliberalism became embedded in modern economic theory, pro-market policies such as reduced regulation, the privatization of public services, and lower taxes became more commonplace. The growing market-based norms in science stem from the fact that this approach to economics began diffusing into other spheres of public life. The way we approached economics also became the way we approached science. Suddenly, scientific discoveries became linked with economic profit maximization and innovation policy, a by-product of neoliberalism’s grip on public affairs. The second part of the chapter highlights how there is an increasing concentration of power and resources in medicine among few actors and disease groups, reflecting on the findings from previous chapters. Chapter 22 also explores how this overconcentration of power may have negative consequences for socially-relevant research, and concludes by providing solutions to counteract this concentration.

Chapter 3 builds on the findings of Chapter 2, i.e. that populists’ rule may work as a driver of illiberal change in democracy and the economy. It identifies two variables by means of which the scenarios concerning the impact populists’ government may have on competition law system can be determined. The first variable is related to the dismantling of checks and balances as well as the rule of law, both of which are inherent to a liberal democracy. The second variableis related to the state-centered character of an economy and economic patriotism. These two variables give rise to four possible scenarios of populists’ government’s influence on a competition law system: the deconstruction scenario, marginalization scenario, atrophy scenario, and limited impact scenario.