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This chapter will address the topical issue of provisional measures in international arbitration as well as its recent offspring, namely emergency arbitration procedures. The aim of this chapter is to understand the historical background of such measures and procedures, their impact on the evolution of domestic legislations with respect to international arbitration, their integration and evolution in arbitration rules as well as their nature. The chapter will thus also address the power of the arbitrator to grant such measures, the type of measures that can be granted, as provisional measures or by an emergency arbitrator, as well as the procedural requirements and substantial conditions necessary to obtain such interim measures. Finally, the issue of enforcement of such measure will also be addressed.
This chapter sets out to capture the practical phenomenon of sharing international obligations by developing a concept of shared obligations. In the stipulation of this concept, the chapter draws from and engages with various scenarios in practice that involve obligations incumbent on multiple states or international organizations, including those obligations that have been designated as ‘shared’, ‘joint’ or ‘collective’ in legal literature. By expanding on three elements that characterize a shared obligation, it is argued that the main characteristic that distinguishes obligations that are shared from obligations that are not shared is the existence of a connection between the bearers of an obligation in the performance of that obligation. It is this particular relationship between the bearers of a shared obligation that gives rise to questions regarding performance and international responsibility: who is bound to do what and, subsequently, who can be held responsible for what in case of a breach? All in all, qualifying a particular obligation as ‘shared’ brings such questions to the forefront, and thereby constitutes the first step towards addressing them.
Each state enjoys full sovereignty over its territory and therefore has, in principle, full jurisdiction over events and persons within its territory. The term “jurisdiction” is often associated with the power of a court to hear a case, but judicial or adjudicative jurisdiction is just one of three manifestations of jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction is also manifested in the authority of states to prescribe rules (legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction) and the power of states to enforce rules (enforcement jurisdiction). Although the power of states to exercise jurisdiction follows from the principle of sovereignty, this power is not unlimited. Each state has to respect the personality and sovereign equality of other states, and overstepping this boundary entails a violation of public international law. This limitation is most pertinent when a state exercises jurisdiction outside its own territory, for example when it enforces domestic legislation outside of its territory or when it extends the application of its domestic laws to people, property, or events outside its own territory. This chapter discusses the scope of the jurisdiction of states when states exercise enforcement, prescriptive, and adjudicative jurisdiction in relation to persons, property, and acts outside their own territory.
Each state enjoys full sovereignty over its territory and therefore has, in principle, full jurisdiction over events and persons within its territory. The term “jurisdiction” is often associated with the power of a court to hear a case, but judicial or adjudicative jurisdiction is just one of three manifestations of jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction is also manifested in the authority of states to prescribe rules (legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction) and the power of states to enforce rules (enforcement jurisdiction). Although the power of states to exercise jurisdiction follows from the principle of sovereignty, this power is not unlimited. Each state has to respect the personality and sovereign equality of other states, and overstepping this boundary entails a violation of public international law. This limitation is most pertinent when a state exercises jurisdiction outside its own territory, for example when it enforces domestic legislation outside of its territory or when it extends the application of its domestic laws to people, property, or events outside its own territory. This chapter discusses the scope of the jurisdiction of states when states exercise enforcement, prescriptive, and adjudicative jurisdiction in relation to persons, property, and acts outside their own territory.
The chapter answers the question of whether international human rights treaties apply to the conduct of States in an area outside the effective control of the territorial State. In international human rights law, ‘jurisdiction’ is the principal criterion of the scope of application ratione loci of conventions. States and monitoring bodies have interpreted the notion of jurisdiction ratione loci first in cases related to the conduct of States beyond their borders (outside State), and later with regard to the territorial State in a part of its own territory outside its effective control. The chapter explains that the two States’ jurisdictions are concurrent and complementary.
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