The chapter presents an overview of the procedural arrangements adopted at the international criminal jurisdictions, namely the UN ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court (ICC), covering the main milestones from the initiation of the investigation to trial phase to appeals against the judgment and sentence and review. Before delving into the trajectories of an criminal case before international criminal courts and tribunals, the chapter highlights the origins of international criminal procedure in the common law (Anglo-American, or ‘adversarial’) and civil law (Continental, or ‘inquisitorial’) approaches, resulting in its legal nature as a hybrid scheme where the balance between the domestic influences varies by tribunal and over time due to reforms pursued by judge-legislators (ICTY and ICTR) or by states and, to a lesser extent, judges (ICC). The chapter reviews the role and functions of the main actors in international criminal proceedings, including repeat or professional players (judges, prosecutors, and defence) and other participants such as victims and witnesses and states and international organisations. It also highlights the normative importance of human rights to international criminal process and the imperative of complying with the principles of public, fair and expeditious proceedings.

Chapter 7 explores the application of the individual criminal responsibility rules to the facts of individual cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC). It looks at the facts and evidence presented by the prosecutor, as well as the conclusions of the judges at the pre-trial and trial stages of proceedings, to ask whether the requirements of the Rome Statute’s modes of liability are met. In view of the practices of the UN tribunals, many members of the international criminal justice community expected that the ICC judges would apply the Rome Statute in a manner that would render convictions easier. Instead, this chapter argues that the assessment of criminal responsibility at the Court has followed a different line of legal reasoning: applying the modes of liability in a restrained manner, regardless of the trial outcome. At the ICC the quality of the process has been cherished as the ultimate prerequisite for ‘ending impunity’ for those crimes. While this vision of international criminal law has been contested by some members of the international criminal justice field, such as human rights advocates, it has continued to dominate the ICC approach to assessing criminal responsibility.

Chapter 8 explores the legal and political dilemmas arising from the assessment of individual criminal responsibility in two ICC cases, which ended in acquittals: Bemba and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé. The analysis focuses on the battles of ideas inside the legal field, situating those dynamics within the broader international political context of the Bemba and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé trials. This chapter offers an illustration of the distinctive and predominant line of legal reasoning at the ICC, a line of legal reasoning that prioritizes the quality of the process through the narrow application of the modes of liability and the meticulous assessment of evidence, all regardless of the trial outcome. The chapter concludes that the Bemba Appeals Chamber Majority and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Chamber Majority have adopted an internal shared understanding about the role of the court in the international society, according to which procedural excellence upholds the integrity of the liberal system of criminal justice and provides an antidote to the false information dominating the modern political world. Nevertheless, the restrained approach to the assessment of criminal responsibility has been contested by dissenting judges, non-governmental organizations, and legal experts.

Chapter 9 explores the legal and political dilemmas arising from the assessment of individual criminal responsibility in two ICC cases, which ended in convictions: Ntaganda and Ongwen. This chapter observes that in those two cases the ICC judges have followed the same line of legal reasoning, premised on a restrained application of the modes of liability, as in the Bemba and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé cases discussed in Chapter 8. However, unlike the Bemba and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé cases, which ended in acquittal, the persons standing trial in Ntaganda and Ongwen had been actively involved in the hostilities, which have resulted in the commission of numerous crimes. The accused’s proximity to the crimes and their willingness to engage in criminal conducts convinced the judges in their criminal responsibility for the crimes, which they had committed personally, as well as the crimes, which they had committed ‘indirectly’, through their troops. Apart from two appeals judges, who expressed some concern with the reliance on the ‘control over the crime’ theory in Ntaganda, the meticulous assessment of the facts in the judgments left little room for contestation of the trial outcomes within the ICL field.