Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

1 results

  • 12 - Cognitive neuroscience

  • from Part III - Research programs
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter surveys some recent philosophical and empirical work on the nature and structure of action, on conscious agency, and on our knowledge of actions. By reuniting the causal approach with the rational approach, the causalists opened the way for a naturalistic stance in action theory and thus for an integration of philosophical and scientific enquiries. Many philosophers introduce a conception of intentions as distinctive, sui generis, mental states. Intentions are responsible for triggering or initiating the intended action (initiating function) and for guiding its course until completion. Dual-intention theories provide a partial answer to the problem of causal deviance. The chapter concentrates on the functional architecture of motor cognition, introducing some of the theoretical concepts, models, and hypotheses that play a central role in current thinking in the motor domain and are of particular relevance for philosophical theorizing on action.