This essay attempts to provide a plausibly sound argument for theological incompatibilism, where (i) theological incompatibilism is the thesis that if theological determinism is true, then for any created agent S, any time t, and any true proposition p, it is not up to S at t whether p and (ii) theological determinism is the thesis that God’s willing what God wills necessitates and explains every other contingent fact. While the argument offered here is similar to other arguments for the same thesis, it is unique insofar as it invokes the technical notions of thorough ontological priority and metaphysically generative relations. In introducing and defining these technical notions, this essay draws on recent philosophical discussions of explanation, grounding, and ontological priority.

In this chapter I begin consideration of the claim that divine determinism undermines human free will. I begin with Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. This argument claims that since humans have no choice about the distant past and the laws of nature—which together determine human actions—humans likewise have no choice about any of their own actions. I argue that although some divine determinists are not threatened by this argument, a revised version of this argument does pose a threat to all divine determinists. This revised argument maintains that since humans have no choice about divine determining activity, they likewise have no choice about their own actions, which are determined but it. After laying out this revised argument, I consider several possible responses to it. In particular, I consider the reply that God’s unique causal activity allows actions to be determined while remaining contingent and the reply that divinely determined agents possess the highest sort of ability to do otherwise that is coherent. I argue that both replies fail, and briefly consider other options for the divine determinist, including semi-compatibilism and hard divine determinism.

In this conclusion of the book, I begin by offering some advice on evaluating the positions of others, especially concerning what we might think of as their willingness to reject clear and obvious intuitions we have in the defense of their positions. I especially call attention to doing so in a way that suggests that all those who reject our intuitions about divine determinism must be willing to do anything to preserve irrational religious beliefs. Intuitions, of course, are not universally shared, and the willingness to accept what others view as implausible is not limited to religious issues. I close by reviewing the challenges to divine determinism that I have explored in this work, noting what I view as the best responses to each and highlighting those that I find the most problematic.