President Andrew Jackson’s Proclamation of 1832 rejected the South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification and rejected secession as a constitutional right. South Carolina’s legislature passed a Counter-Proclamation that citizens of states owed their chief allegiance to their sovereign state and not the national government and were duty-bound to maintain sovereign states’ rights. Increasingly, Americans failed to find common ground in their understanding of constitutional history. Enforcement of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause generated important Supreme Court cases such as Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) and Ableman v. Booth (1859) as Southern states sought to enforce the Slave Clause through federal legislation such as the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Northern states responded by passing personal liberty laws to resist the enforcement of federal laws that would extend the authority of enslavers beyond the South. Southern states considered these personal liberty laws a nullification of federal law and as intended to eradicate slavery. The Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854 and the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 moved the nation beyond interposition towards secession and civil war.

The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 that James Madison and Thomas Jefferson authored as a repudiation of the Federalist-backed Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 are incorrectly viewed as originating the idea that John C. Calhoun would develop into his theory of nullification, that is, the right of an individual state to veto federal law. Although these interposition resolutions lacked support from other states, their interstate circulation mobilized a grassroots movement that helped elect Jefferson as President in 1800 and overturned Federalist policies. Despite their political success, what Jefferson and Madison meant by language they used in the resolutions burdened the future efforts of states seeking to monitor the governmental balancing of powers and resulted in a deeply troubling political legacy. Madison drew subtle but crucial constitutional distinctions, yet failed to explain what he meant by the theoretical right of the sovereign people to interpose in the last resort (expressed in the Virginia Resolution and in his Report of 1800). Moreover, Jefferson’s statements that unconstitutional laws were null and void seemingly foreshadowed the remedy of nullification.

Harsh migration enforcement has sparked courageous humanitarian reactions and hundreds of criminal prosecutions. Such prosecutions ostensibly seek to vindicate the power of governments to control nation-state borders. But they seem, ironically, to have achieved the opposite: They have vindicated, reinvigorated – and even inspired new forms of – basic human rights. This chapter examines three cases: Cédric Herrou, a French olive farmer who was criminally tried for assisting unauthorized migrants in France; German “rescue” ship captains, Carola Rackete and Pia Klemp, prosecuted for rescuing distressed migrants at sea and bringing them to Lampedusa, Italy; and Scott Warren, prosecuted after allegedly providing food, water, beds, and clean clothes to undocumented immigrants in Arizona. The verdict in Herrou’s case was overturned because fraternity was recognized as a constitutional value. Captains Klemp and Rackete appealed to the ideal of “solidarity.” Warren’s attorney intoned to the jury, “Being a good Samaritan is not against the law ….” These encounters implicate deep questions of constitutional legitimacy and migrant rights, involving the presence of migrants with definable – if not yet enforceable – rights claims. They illustrate a dynamic process of mediating tensions between “sovereign” power and human rights, an essential revitalizing project for constitutional democracy and human rights law.

Examining privacy theory begins with what is absent from present accounts, that is, the central importance of our personal concerns about our existential reality. These concerns, and the disposition to seek ways to distance and camouflage them with constructed concerns, is at the heart of the inducements of what emerged as the mythological trajectory of Deity, State, Market and Technology. The impact of the ideas and practices left behind by these failed but persisting magnitudes is what is normalised in us and comes to comprise what we see as our private world. However, these ideas and practices are mythological subjections. There are two dominant present accounts of privacy, the ‘Constitutional’ (which is sourced from the ideas and practices of Deity, State and Market), which is primarily a bourgeois account, and the ‘Selected Flow of Information’ account (which is inspired by the movement of information within a social context, especially in the technological age). Given the mythological content of both accounts, the way forward needs to take an entirely different approach. This will relocate existential reality to the centre of its frame but also emphasise an ethic which rejects subjection, one framed by respectful self-responsibility.

Aplasia is a pathologic term that is broadly defined as the absence or near-absence of one or more haematopoietic lineages in the bone marrow (BM). Clinically, BM aplasia affecting more than one lineage is referred to as aplastic anaemia (AA), despite the fact that this group of disorders often results in pancytopaenia rather than anaemia alone. Cytopaenias can be seen in a number of different conditions, and new-onset pancytopaenia in children and adults requires an extensive work-up, including a BM core biopsy (BMB) for confirmation of haematopoietic aplasia/hypoplasia and exclusion of an infiltrative marrow process or fibrosis. Bone marrow aplasia develops as a result of injury to multipotent haematopoietic stem cells, which can occur in the context of constitutional (primary aplasia) or acquired (secondary aplasia) disorders (Table 4.1). This chapter will discuss the diagnostic criteria and pathophysiology of specific disorders presenting with aplasia and demonstrate an algorithmic approach to the diagnostic evaluation of patients presenting with this common and non-specific finding (Table 4.2).