The relationship between international and domestic law in Indonesia is the subject of prolonged debate caused by the silence of the Indonesian Constitution on the choice between monism and dualism, which affects constitutional adjudication. This article discusses how the Constitutional Court engages with international law in its decisions and how the debate between monism and dualism is affected by it. It argues that the practice of the Court falls neither within the traditional scope of monism nor dualism but tends to be eclectic, which can be termed pragmatic monism. Here, the Court considers an international treaty part of domestic law upon ratification. However, its contents are only applicable if they are consistent with the Constitution, the highest law in the country. Nevertheless, such pragmatism is not without consequences where the consistency of the constitutional system as a whole is compromised for the instrumentality of its individual decisions on societal well-being.

This article examines the necessity for constitutional adjudication in a democracy. Democracy is not the government of the minority by the majority, but self-government of the people in a pluralist society. The article regards constitutional adjudication as a necessary component of a constitutional democracy to preserve self-government and individual rights as a pre-condition for the acceptance of majority decisions by the minority. Thus, constitutional adjudication is needed to uphold the possibility of democratic change and to protect individual rights also against the majority. Recent critique of individual decisions does not change this basic insight and practice of constitutional democracies.

This article provides a comparative analysis of how courts have performed judicial review on supermajority rules governing courts’ decision-making. Through an empirical approach, covering the cases of the United States, Peru and Poland, the article argues that the supermajority’s legal source and the chronology of its establishment may influence the court’s ability to review such rules and the case’s outcome. Finally, the article addresses the paradox of whether courts must apply the very provision they are tasked to review.

Through the analytical framework of ‘transnational constitutional engagement’, this article examines the dynamically developing practices of the South Korean Constitutional Court as it engages with international and foreign elements, both within and beyond constitutional adjudication processes. Diverse underlying factors and orientations in varied contexts, and the complex interactions between them, are responsible for shaping the modes of a local constitutional actor’s engagement with the transnational. In the vertical aspect, the court adopts international human rights law as a substantive standard of constitutional review through a version of cosmopolitan constitutional interpretation, while it has nevertheless exhibited ambiguity and incoherency in concrete applications. The horizontal aspects of transnational engagement include the court’s practice of referencing foreign law and cases in constitutional adjudication. The vibrancy and the evolving patterns of its citation practice reflect the court’s growing self-perception vis-à-vis the world – although limitations remain, such as geographical asymmetries among referenced jurisdictions. The court has also been enthusiastic in interacting with various transnational counterparts beyond adjudication processes, demonstrating eminent leadership in regional network-building among constitutional courts in Asia. With both cosmopolitan aspirations and nationalist ambitions playing a role in their shaping, the modes of transnational constitutional engagement are not to be generalized, but require contextualization, and the relevant practices should be subject to constant evaluations for their contribution in producing sound and effective concretizations of the values of global constitutionalism.

This Article argues that a) constitutional supremacy is affected by the legal tradition, which implies that it is a concept largely shaped by the legal context in which it is elaborated, and b) the common law version of constitutional supremacy determines a sort of cultural resistance to constitutional imperialism. In making its argument, this Article begins with the doctrine of sources of law with a view to unpack its operational logic within the common law and, therefore, to understand how the supremacy of constitutions is conceptualized. It then examines the embryonic conceptualization of constitutional supremacy in the British legal culture by addressing the “constitutional statutes.” It goes on to analyse how constitutional supremacy is safeguarded in jurisdictions that are affected by the British tradition and equipped with written constitutions, to show how constitutions concretely established themselves as supreme laws without neglecting the relevance of traditions pre-dating the constitutional texts. It then shows how the common law finds its way to be applied alongside or even instead of the constitution. Eventually, this Article offers some conclusions as to the implications of such a conceptualization of constitutional supremacy for comparative and global constitutional studies.

In this paper, I argue that the conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union is the story of a clash foretold, if one takes seriously constitutional courts as institutions designed to be “dogs that bite.” The German Court consistently developed a doctrinal tool to guide its role as guardian of the national constitutional order and the democratic principle, and enforced it when the constitutional control of monetary policy measures so required. I analyze the PSPP ruling, focusing on where the Court concluded that the lack of a satisfactory statement of reasons by the European Central Bank prevented it from reviewing the proportionality of the program. I argue that the Court, after conducting a substantive assessment, applied a weak remedy, thereby deferring the last word on the constitutionality of the PSPP to the political branches. In doing so, the Court opens space for the political assessment of a controversial monetary policy, enhancing the politicization of the Economic and Monetary Union, and provides a doctrinal toolbox for national constitutional courts that face competence creep of EU law in their jurisdictions. I conclude that, ultimately, the main merit of constitutional courts’ interventions in the EU integration is that they are in a privileged position to allow for the politicization of technocratic processes.