Informality has long been valued in England, and this is true of the political process as well as the institution of the judiciary. In both cases, it is assumed that the senior figures will have absorbed unwritten conventions and will by osmosis naturally understand their respective role in the UK constitution. Much is now starting to change, at least as far as the English judiciary is concerned. It is, first, argued that informal judicial institutions did not become redundant when the separation of powers was formally introduced with a program of modernization of the judiciary in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Selected illustrations of persisting informal judicial institutions are then discussed in relation to the deliberative processes in senior courts; to judicial selection and appointments; and to the disciplinary process. Second, informal judicial institutions are deeply connected with the UK constitutional tradition. The Brexit litigation laid bare the challenges of containing political behavior within certain boundaries, and the unwritten conventions which have bound the judiciary and the executive might now be instinctively understood and shared by only one of these two parties.

On 22 June 2022 the Bill of Rights Bill to replace the Human Rights Act 1998 was introduced to the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament. Just over a year later, it was withdrawn. This was not a minor update, as claimed by the Conservative government, but a wholesale revision of a fundamental feature of UK constitutional arrangements. Given that the UK has no codified constitution, it is not out of the ordinary for constitutional change to proceed via ordinary Act of Parliament. But what was unusual was the informal methods used by the government in its attempt to push through its bill of rights. Searching for a word or phrase to capture what happened over this time in the UK is difficult, not only because of the absence of a conventional method for constitutional change. Most scholarship focuses on formal rather than informal processes for amendment. The purpose of this article is therefore to make a contribution towards filling this gap by introducing the phrase ‘autocratic method’ to describe a particular method of constitutional change as opposed to its substance. Using existing scholarship, and examples from other States, a preliminary definition and essential features of the autocratic method are set out. Further detail is gained through a study of the attempted replacement of the Human Rights Act. Whilst the Bill of Rights Bill is no longer going ahead, this episode in UK constitutional history contains important lessons not just for the UK but for any State embarking on a process of constitutional change.

How should the constitutional reform in Israel be assessed in comparative terms? Comparative constitutional understandings point to the centrality of three key sets of norms as part of the ‘democratic minimum core’: (i) commitments to free and fair, regular multi-party elections; (ii) political rights and freedoms; and (iii) a system of institutional checks and balances necessary to maintain (i) and (ii). Any change in judicial power and independence must be assessed against the benchmark of the democratic minimum core, and by reference to its cumulative practical effect on a system of institutional checks and balances.

We claim that recent changes in Israel may already threaten these institutional checks, and have the potential to do more damage in the future, if given broad effect and if combined with further changes in the power and independence of the Supreme Court. On this basis, we suggest, the relevant changes should be viewed as either ‘abusive’ or ‘proto-abusive’ in nature. By threatening to undermine both the power and independence of the Supreme Court of Israel, they directly threaten the health of the constitutional checks and balances system and, hence, the ‘democratic minimum core’ in Israel.

Paradoxically, at roughly the same time in the Netherlands the amendment bill to introduce constitutional review by the judiciary of acts of parliament lapsed in 2018, the State Commission on the Parliamentary System recommended that such review be introduced. This Article analyzes Dutch exceptionalism on the topic of prohibiting constitutional review and comes to the conclusion that it cannot be justified. Focusing on the nature of constitutional change in the country, the recommendation is made that the quest for reform should start with the courts, and not with the constitutional legislature, as has been the case to date.

In legal orders around the world, commitments to democracy, liberalism and constitutionalism are increasingly eroding. Although political and constitutional theorists often lament this trend, they invariably adopt frameworks that are indifferent to these commitments. My aims in this article are both critical and constructive. As a critical matter, I will expose the indifference of the leading political and constitutional theories to the emergence, maintenance and refinement of liberal democratic constitutional orders. As a constructive matter, I will draw on Immanuel Kant’s constitutional theory to explain why realizing such a form of governance is a public duty and why receding from it is a public wrong.

The Isle of Man is a largely autonomous dependent territory of the UK. In 2016, Lord Lisvane was commissioned to report on the functioning of the principal organ of governance, the Tynwald. This Lisvane Review has led to substantial constitutional reform within this small democracy, particularly in relation to the unelected second chamber of Tynwald, the Legislative Council. This reflects an ancient tension within the Manx constitution between the House of Keys, since the mid-nineteenth century a directly elected chamber, and the unelected Legislative Council. The Lisvane period saw important changes to the composition and powers of the Legislative Council, as well as gender diversity within Tynwald as a whole. Placing the Manx experience within a broader small democracy theoretical and comparative framework demonstrates not only the possibility of constitutional reform, but also provides insights into resources for constitutional development, the special challenges of managing intimacy, and the dangers of over-concentration of power in a small democracy.

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the result of the referendum on constitutional reform held in Italy on 4 December 2016. The votes against (59.1%) won by a significant margin, with an unexpectedly high turnout at the polls and more than 33 million citizens voting. Using as a point of departure the polls carried out prior to and following the referendum, in which Italians said they were essentially in favour of the reform proposed by the prime minister, the essay focuses on the mistakes made by Matteo Renzi that discouraged Italians from voting Yes. These touch on all aspects of the referendum: 1) the parliamentary process, 2) its combination with electoral law, 3) institutional communication, and 4) his political analysis and strategic approach. The final section evaluates the effects of the referendum result on the Italian political system, emphasising the setback to reformism and the strengthening of the anti-system parties that support leaving the Euro (in particular the Movimento 5 Stelle).

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the framework of transition and the enactment of a new constitution for Egypt. It does so by using the relatively under explored concept of transitional constitutionalism, interrogating some of the key claims on which transitional constitutionalism is based, and questioning their application in the Egyptian context. By doing this the paper explores the broader paradox of the imposition of a framework of transition that is rooted in principles of liberalism in the context where liberalism is far from the agreed or prevailing political model.

This article presents a bird's-eye view of two decades of UN rule of law assistance in Africa. The article is based on a dataset developed by the Folke Bernadotte Academy which covers a total of 36 UN peace operations (peacekeeping, political missions and offices).

Implementing comprehensive rule of law strategies is challenging for the UN as a whole, not least where peace operations are deployed. Such operations are deployed in situations where the rule of law is severely tested and where in such environments UN staff perform a number of critical functions, ranging from developing national rule of law plans and strategies, coordinating national and international stakeholders, advising on justice matters and providing technical expertise on specific topics. For the two leading UN entities in relation to post-conflict societies, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs, the translating of rule of law policy into practical programme activities is a daunting task, specifically in terms of providing assistance that is timely, situational and aligned with the national priorities of the host country.

While there have been many positive developments in the UN's rule of law system over the past decade in terms of policy, practical experience and competencies earned on the ground, observations made on the basis of empirical data raise a number of questions critical to the UN's future commitment to rule of law assistance in peacekeeping and peace-building.

The results of the 2008 Italian general election were welcomed by many as the ‘sunrise of the Third Republic’, heralding a new political system which would emerge from a comprehensive constitutional reform agreed between the main parties of government and opposition. The party system now looks significantly different from that (or those) of the ‘Second Republic’. In particular, the disappearance of the radical left from Parliament and a clear reduction in the number of parties are the main factors underpinning optimistic predictions about a possible compromise on constitutional reform. Drawing on Sartori's classic work as well as on more recent conceptualisations of party systems, this article analyses the evolution of the Italian party system over the medium and long term. It is cautious, if not pessimistic, about the prospects for reform. High levels of polarisation, stemming from different conceptions of democracy maintained by the two main parties, can be expected to hinder bipartisan reform. In particular, the figure of Berlusconi appears to represent both the cornerstone of the ‘reconstructed’ party system and the main obstacle to a widely agreed re-drafting of the Constitution.

Historical development of the Finnish system of government – A semi-presidential system necessary in the oppressive post-Civil War atmosphere – Reinforcement of the Presidency during World War II and the Cold War – 1982-1995: A reform process of partial revisions – ‘The Constitution of the year 2000’: a considerable step towards a genuine parliamentary form of government – The challenges of European integration for the dual executive.

Constitutional reform in Germany – Modernization of the German federal system is only a first step – Why reforming German Federalism was necessary – Steps and factors in the constitutional reform process – Substance – Issues and agenda for future reform on financial relations.

Historical background of the Italian Constitution – Main features – Golden age of constitutional enforcement – Italian political renewal – Fathers and sons – The great reform proposal – The 2006 referendum – The upshot.

The protest by over half a million people on July 1, 2003, unleashed the most serious crisis of governance in Hong Kong since its retrocession to China in 1997. Triggered by the government's attempt to legislate new national security legislation, it exposed more fundamental institutional defects of an increasingly weakened government. This article puts forward two arguments. First, the political logic of the pre-1997 period was not compatible with the post-1997 political environment and public sentiment, resulting in a widening cognitive gap between government and people. Second, the former colonial administration, despite its non-democratic nature, was able to secure sufficient public acquiescence and acceptance through economic performance and service delivery. The new government was constrained by both economic and fiscal difficulties and unexpected social crises. A declining capacity to perform effectively had further eroded public support. Attempted reforms of the bureaucracy and the introduction of a new ministerial system had caused greater political-administrative disjunction and actually compounded the crisis of governance.