This chapter explores the terms of letters patent for internal colonial government. It observes that every patent to a private colonizer prescribed a balanced colonial constitution: Some type of independent legislature in the colony, separate from the colonial executive, was to consult on laws and taxes. The chapter presents a strategic model to explain why this served the crown’s interest: An independent colonial legislature could restrain excessive extraction from colonists by colonial executives, which the crown itself – given the distance and its limited capacity – could not do.

How did colonies develop under contractual imperialism? This chapter reviews three important cases – Virginia, Massachusetts Bay, and Barbados – and argues that contractual imperialism had important successes. Under contractual imperialism, colonizers did search vigorously for resource endowments, and made and re-made their economies at significant cost to exploit them. Patent terms for balanced colonial polities did restrain some of the excesses of colonial government under their founding elites. At the same time, experience revealed important problems with contractual imperialism: It was not effective at coordinating an empire of multiple colonies, and it provided such strong incentives that it generated significant factional disputes within colonies. Nevertheless, under contractual imperialism, English colonies established successful cash-crop economies.

As English state capacity grew and the crown faced growing financial constraints at home, colonies became tempting targets. This chapter explores the crown’s attempts to unwind the institutions of contractual imperialism and assert unilateral, direct control over colonies. However, when the crown made these attempts, colonial institutions had taken deep root over decades. The chapter explains why the crown was unable to force its vision of government on the colonies autocratically, and instead pivoted to a negotiated model of governance: Regulatory imperialism.

This chapter explores the terms of letters patent for early colonies, particularly in their economic dimensions. It shows the textual basis for colonial autonomy in these patents as grants from the crown. In particular, patents granted long-term control of colonies to private actors, protected their control over colonial economic operations, and obliged minimal sharing of their economic output with the crown. The chapter presents the theory of contractual imperialism to explain why these contract terms solved an important incentive problem: To induce colonial agents to identify profitable resource endowments, despite great cost and risk, and to exploit them fully.