Improving the quality of life of captive animals is dependent on developing valid measures of how animals feel about their lives. It has recently been suggested that biases in information processing may offer a novel means of understanding animal emotions. Anxious and depressed people tend to interpret ambiguous information negatively. We explored the proposal that such cognitive biases also exist in non-human animals and could therefore be used as novel measures of animal welfare. We used a novel cognitive bias task based on a learnt taste aversion to determine whether birds deprived of environmental enrichment show biases in their classification of ambiguous signals. We hypothesised that starlings in enriched cages should be more likely to classify ambiguous signals as being associated with a positive outcome than starlings housed in standard, unenriched cages. Starlings were trained on a go/no-go procedure to discriminate between two visual stimuli (cardboard lids of white and dark grey) associated with outcomes of a different value (palatable and unpalatable mealworms hidden underneath). Individual birds' responses to unreinforced, intermediate stimuli (various shades of grey between white and dark grey) were subsequently examined while each bird was housed sequentially in both standard and enriched cages. The probability of a bird classifying an ambiguous pale grey lid as hiding a palatable mealworm was lower in standard cages than enriched cages, but this difference was found only in birds that received enriched cages first. Our results can be interpreted as showing a pessimistic bias in birds that have recently experienced a decline in environmental quality. These findings support the use of cognitive bias-based tasks as a novel, non-invasive technique for assessing welfare in non-human animals.

Previous studies of loss aversion in decisions under risk have led to mixed results. Losses appear to loom larger than gains in some settings, but not in others. The current paper clarifies these results by highlighting six experimental manipulations that tend to increase the likelihood of the behavior predicted by loss aversion. These manipulations include: (1) framing of the safe alternative as the status quo; (2) ensuring that the choice pattern predicted by loss aversion maximizes the probability of positive (rather than zero or negative) outcomes; (3) the use of high nominal (numerical) payoffs; (4) the use of high stakes; (5) the inclusion of highly attractive risky prospects that creates a contrast effect; and (6) the use of long experiments in which no feedback is provided and in which the computation of the expected values is difficult. In addition, the results suggest the possibility of learning in the absence of feedback: The tendency to select simple strategies, like “maximize the worst outcome” which implies “loss aversion”, increases when this behavior is not costly. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

We examine how adding an Attractive but Unattainable Alternative (AUA) to a set of available but less attractive alternatives influences evaluations of near vs. distant future sets of alternatives. According to Construal Level Theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008) including an AUA would decrease the attractiveness of near future sets, but may increase the attractiveness of distant future sets. In four studies participants imagined a choice situation with three alternatives. For some participants a fourth alternatives was added, which was attractive but unattainable. Half of the participants in each condition imagined making a decision in the near future whereas others imagined making the decision in the distant future. Participants then evaluated the attractiveness of the entire set of alternatives, as well as of each alternative separately. We examined choices between jobs, computers and roommates. The last study examined negotiations with the landlord about an apartment. Consistent with our hypothesis, an AUA increased the evaluation of the distant set and decreased the evaluation of the near set.

People often use tools for tasks, and sometimes there is uncertainty about whether a given task can be completed with a given tool. This project explored whether, when, and how people’s optimism about successfully completing a task with a given tool is affected by the contextual salience of a better or worse tool. In six studies, participants were faced with novel tasks. For each task, they were assigned a tool but also exposed to a comparison tool that was better or worse in utility (or sometimes similar in utility). In some studies, the tool comparisons were essentially social comparisons, because the tool was assigned to another person. In other studies, the tool comparisons were merely counterfactual rather than social. The studies revealed contrast effects on optimism, and the effect worked in both directions. That is, worse comparison tools boosted optimism and better tools depressed optimism. The contrast effects were observed regardless of the general type of comparison (e.g., social, counterfactual). The comparisons also influenced discrete decisions about which task to attempt (for a prize), which is an important finding for ruling out superficial scaling explanations for the contrast effects. It appears that people fail to exclude irrelevant tool-comparison information from consideration when assessing their likelihood of success on a task, resulting in biased optimism and decisions.