If a firm is a nexus of contracts, then it is just the sum of its counterparties. It follows that when a firm monopolizes a particular market and exploits its power to impose unfavourable terms on a counterparty, the firm necessarily exploits one counterparty for the benefit of another, because the additional profits the firm generates from the unfavourable terms must be paid out eventually to some other counterparty of the firm. One alternative to attacking monopoly power through breakup of large firms or limits on anticompetitive conduct in the marketplace is therefore to prevent any one counterparty of the firm from so dominating firm governance as to be able to induce the firm to oppress other counterparties for its benefit. Creating a balance of power in firm governance, by giving each class of counterparties (i.e., workers, suppliers, investors, and consumers) an equal say over the choice of board members, would eliminate the internal forces that induce firms to exercise monopoly power. But it would not prevent firms from engaging in productive, pie-expanding, behaviour, because such behaviour tends to expand the business that the firm does with all of its counterparties—or at least enables the firm to use a share of the gains to compensate those counterparties that lose out—and therefore benefits them all.

The nature of stewardship varies based on shareholder structures. In the Nordic region (similar to many Asian jurisdictions), the role of states, sovereign holding companies and wealth funds, other public market actors such as public pension funds, families, family-controlled investment companies and family-based foundations is significant compared to (other) national and international institutional investors. In this chapter, we discuss the peculiarities of Nordic stewardship as a backdrop for our analysis of Norwegian stewardship, which is dominated by the state and the municipalities, but also to some extent by private investors. In Part II we discuss the Nordic stewardship in light of international stewardship discussion, before concentrating on Norway and the current regulatory framework of stewardship there in Part III, reflecting on the Norwegian choices concerning stewardship in light of global challenges. Part IV reflectss on why a stewardship code is not needed in Norway. What Norway does need, is a clear and mandatory regulation to ensure that Norwegian business and finance contribute to the transition to sustainability. A stewardship code would not be a sufficiently strong measure. Conversely, it could hold Norwegian business and finance back in the face of the rapid developments on EU and international level.

In the preface, we set the stage for the rest of the book. Corporations have a tremendous amount of power and play a major role in a number of contemporary issues, including income inequality, global warming, and the financial crisis. The principal theory of corporate governance – shareholder primacy – is well entrenched in law and practice, but its intellectual foundations are falling apart. Academic groups are split into different camps advocating for more or less shareholder empowerment. The traditional, law and economics arguments for the core governance feature – the exclusive shareholder franchise – have been revealed to rest on faulty assumptions and flawed reasoning. And both corporate governance theorists and corporate and economic luminaries are openly questioning the stability of shareholder primacy as a continuing regulatory norm. There are, however, a dearth of alternative approaches, so shareholder primacy lumbers on toward the point of crisis. It is time to assess where we are and offer a new way forward.