In Our Lives in Their Portfolios, Brett Christophers provides an account of the rise of ‘asset manager society’ – a world in which the infrastructures of public life are converted from public to private ownership. Here I use Christophers’ analysis to comment on growing calls for asset manager investment in climate adaptation. The asset manager business model requires ever-escalating returns, a poor fit with the now unavoidable losses that climate change promises to bring.

This article explores the financing of early industrial corporations using newly constructed panel data from Imperial Russian balance sheets. We document how corporate capital structures and dividend payout policies reflected internal agency issues, information asymmetries with external investors, life cycle considerations, and other frictions present in the Russian context. In particular, we find that widely held, listed and more profitable corporations were less reliant on debt financing. Asset tangibility was associated with lower debt levels, suggesting that Russian corporate debt was short-term, collateral was largely irrelevant, or agency problems dominated. Finally, we find that many of these same issues, for example ownership structure and access to securities markets, also mattered for financial performance and that dividends may have compensated investors for poor legal protections.

About USD7 trillion of quantitative easing funds has flooded emerging markets since 2008. These funds, created to stimulate a recovery in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and to stabilise financial markets, ended up mostly as emerging markets’ corporate bonds and loans (often after being leveraged into many multiples of their original value). Not for the first time, emerging markets became the financial markets of last resort. These funds were then either mainly invested (Asia) or used (as in Latin America and South Africa) for almost anything except for creating additional productive capacities. Enquiries into these issues, especially how corporations financed their investment, were subjects that fascinated economist Ajit Singh. He was the first to find out that corporations in emerging markets relied much more on external finance than those in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (where retained profits played a major role). The implication was that they were likely to be more susceptible to the vicissitudes of financial markets, and these have become even more weird since quantitative easing, as Northern ‘investors’, in search for elusive yields, have been happy to take on ever higher risks, leverage and illiquidity in the South. This is a key difference between current global financial fragilities and those at the onset of the current global financial crisis in 2007. The stakes for emerging economies and international financial markets could scarcely be higher, but unfortunately these huge new challenges occur at the worst possible time, as our social imagination has seldom been so barren.

After assuming sole ownership of the Ford Motor Company in 1919, Henry Ford transformed his business into a mission-driven organization that prioritized improvements in production and engineering over investment returns. At the same time, the company programmatically rejected bureaucratic management in favor of informal procedures and ingrained collective protocols, both in administration and on the shop floor. This article references Max Weber's view of “charismatic” authority to explain the company’s organizational structure, its culture, its ambivalence toward Henry Ford’s worst tendencies and prejudices, and its resilience during the decline of his leadership in the 1930s and 1940s.

America's securities markets constitute a central distinguishing feature of its brand of capitalism. What are their political origins? In contrast to arguments which point to business owners as determining the institutional foundations of America's political economy, this paper argues that farmers played a leading role. Indeed, the rules and regulations governing U.S. securities markets were created in opposition to the wishes of business owners, and without farmers' political influence, the U.S. may have developed a financial system similar to that found in continental Europe. Moreover, to the extent that U.S. securities regulations serve as a template for international financial standards, the paper shows that the humble American farmer inadvertently contributed to the financialization of the modern global economy.

The purpose of this article by Peter Savage of Cobbetts is to give a brief introduction to the methods used by companies to raise money by both debt and equity financing methods, primarily on the public markets in the City of London, and to set the background to the involvement of lawyers in the process.

A number of ongoing reforms of corporate law are motivated by the need to stimulate entrepreneurship and business creation. Building on the observations that entry is characterised by sunk costs and that the markets for small business finance are imperfectly competitive, we identify a previously overlooked trade-off that such reforms ought to recognise. The appropriate design of the corporate law depends on whether it is the midstream moral hazard and the ensuing lack of finance or the entrepreneurs' inability to recover sunk entry costs that hamper business creation. In circumstances where the former dominates, well-designed mandatory law ought to be efficiency enhancing. In contrast, if the incentives to enter are weak due to the prospect of facing powerful external financiers in the market for post-entry expansion finance, business creation can be boosted by making the law more enabling. Enabling law increases the effective bargaining power of the entrepreneurs in market conditions where their bargaining position would otherwise be weak. It does so by giving the entrepreneurs a credible threat to expropriate the financiers. To the best of our knowledge, neither this trade-off nor the associated effects of corporate law on entry and entrepreneurship have been considered elsewhere in the literature on mandatory v. enabling rules.

We study the relation of financial contracting and the pace of technological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A firm which is financed by outside shareholders but run by managers has the prospect of a process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires firing old management and hiring new with skills appropriate for the new technique. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in this game can be of two types. In “entrenchment” equilibrium once the new technique has been announced old style management raises their dividend payout sufficiently to preempt the innovation. In “maximum rent extraction” equilibrium’ managers are unable or unwilling to match the impending productivity improvement and instead respond by increasing their perquisites for the remaining time of their tenure. We show that both equilibria involve several types of inefficiencies and can result in underinvestment in positive NPV projects. We discuss the role of financial innovation in reducing the inefficiencies identified.

Nous mettons en évidence une incitation des entreprises à financer leur client plutôt qu’acquérir un actif certain. À l’équilibre, l’entreprise bénéficie d’un rendement supérieur via un accroissement de la corrélation des risques de faillite avec son client. Dans un second temps, nous comparons les risques de défaillance de l’entreprise créancière selon le type de financement choisi: créance-client ou actif sans risque. Nous montrons que la présence de crédit interentreprises aggrave le risque de faillite du prêteur quand les risques d’exploitation du fournisseur et du client sont indépendants mais le laisse inchangé quand les risques de production sont parfaitement córreles.

Franco Modigliani's contributions in economics and finance have transformed both fields. Although many other major contributions in those fields have come and gone, Modigliani's contributions seem to grow in importance with time. His famous 1944 article on liquidity preference has not only remained required reading for generations of Keynesian economists but has become part of the vocabulary of all economists. The implications of the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption and saving provided the primary motivation for the incorporation of finite lifetime models into macroeconomics and had a seminal role in the growth in macroeconomics of the overlapping generations approach to modeling of Allais, Samuelson, and Diamond. Modigliani and Miller's work on the cost of capital transformed corporate finance and deeply influenced subsequent research on investment, capital asset pricing, and recent research on derivatives. Modigliani received the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics in 1985.

In macroeconomic policy, Modigliani has remained influential on two continents. In the United States, he played a central role in the creation of a the Federal Reserve System's large-scale quarterly macroeconometric model, and he frequently participated in the semiannual meetings of academic consultants to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, D.C. His visibility in European policy matters is most evident in Italy, where nearly everyone seems to know him as a celebrity, from his frequent appearances in the media. In the rest of Europe, his visibility has been enhanced by his publication, with a group of distinguished European and American economists, of “An Economists' Manifesto on Unemployment in the European Union,” which was signed by a number of famous economists and endorsed by several others.

This interview was conducted in two parts on different dates in two different locations, and later unified. The initial interview was conducted by Robert Solow at Modigliani's vacation home in Martha's Vineyard. Following the transcription of the tape from that interview, the rest of the interview was conducted by William Barnett in Modigliani's apartment on the top floor of a high-rise building overlooking the Charles River near Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Those concluding parts of the interview in Cambridge continued for the two days of November 5–6, 1999 with breaks for lunch and for the excellent espresso coffee prepared by Modigliani in an elaborate machine that would be owned only by someone who takes fine coffee seriously.

Although the impact that Modigliani has had on the economics and finance professions is clear to all members of those professions, only his students can understand the inspiration that he has provided to them. However, that may have been adequately reflected by Robert Shiller at Yale University in correspondence regarding this interview, when he referred to Modigliani as: “my hero.”