In this paper, we explore how to design the optimal insurance contracts when the insured faces insurable, counterparty, and additive background risk simultaneously. The target is to minimize the mean-variance of the insured’s loss. By utilizing the calculus of variations, an implicit characterization of the optimal ceded loss function is given. An explicit structure of the optimal ceded loss function is also provided by making full use of its implicit characterization. We further derive a much simpler solution when these three kinds of risk have some special dependence structures. Finally, we give a numerical example to illustrate our results.

In this paper, we study the credit default swap (CDS) pricing with counterparty risk in a reduced form model. The default jump intensities of the reference firm and counterparty are both assumed to follow the mean-reverting CIR processes with independent jumps respectively and a common jump. The approximate closed-form solutions of the joint survival probability density and the probability density of the first default can be obtained by using the PDE method. Then with the expressions of the probability densities, we can get the formula for the CDS price with counterparty risk in a reduced form model with a common jump. In the numerical analysis part, we find that the default of the reference asset has a greater impact on the CDS price than that of the default of counterparty after introducing the common jump process.

This paper studies the optimal insurance design from the perspective of an insured when there is possibility for the insurer to default on its promised indemnity. Default of the insurer leads to limited liability, and the promised indemnity is only partially recovered in case of a default. To alleviate the potential ex post moral hazard, an incentive compatibility condition is added to restrict the permissible indemnity function. Assuming that the premium is determined as a function of the expected coverage and under the mean–variance preference of the insured, we derive the explicit structure of the optimal indemnity function through the marginal indemnity function formulation of the problem. It is shown that the optimal indemnity function depends on the first and second order expectations of the random recovery rate conditioned on the realized insurable loss. The methodology and results in this article complement the literature regarding the optimal insurance subject to the default risk and provide new insights on problems of similar types.

A credit default swap (CDS) is an exchange of premium payments for a compensation for the occurrence of a credit event. Counterparty risks refer to defaults of parties holding CDS contracts. In this paper we develop a valuation/pricing model for a CDS subject to counterparty risks. Using the Cox–Ingersoll–Ross (CIR) model for interest rate and first arrival times of Poisson processes with variable intensities for the occurrences of credit default and counterparty defaults, we derive a mathematical formulation and make a full theoretical investigation. In addition, we develop a full theory for the corresponding infinite horizon problem and establish its connection with the asymptotic long expiry behaviour of finite horizon problem. Furthermore, we establish a connection between two major frameworks for default times: the structure model approach and the intensity model approach. We show that a solution of the structure model can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of solutions of intensity models. Regarded as an important theoretical development, we remove a constraint typically imposed on the parameters of the CIR model; that is, the well-posedness (existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence of parameters) of the mathematical model holds for any empirically calibrated parameters for the CIR model.

The current banking crisis has reminded us of how risks materialising in one part of the financial system can have a widespread impact, affecting other financial markets and institutions and the broader economy. This paper, prepared on behalf of the Actuarial Profession, examines how such events have an impact on the entire financial system and explores whether such disturbances may arise within the insurance and pensions sectors as well as within banking. The paper seeks to provide an overview of a number of banking and other financial crises which have occurred in the past, illustrated by four case studies. It discusses what constitutes a systemic event and what distinguishes it from a large aggregate system wide shock. Finally, it discusses how policy-makers can respond to the risk of such systemic financial failures.