Dans la littérature existante, les auteurs associent l'absence et la non-récurrence des intrusions militaires dans le champ politique à la peur des sanctions d'un éventuel échec, à des nominations militaires sélectives sur la base identitaire, à la mise en place de contrepoids militaires, à l'institutionnalisation d'un régime de privilèges militaires et au sens de professionnalisme de l'armée. Partant du postulat que les militaires sont des acteurs rationnels dont la loyauté et la fidélité peuvent évoluer en fonction des conjonctures et des « fenêtres d'opportunités » qui se présentent à eux, cet article montre que ces facteurs ont un pouvoir explicatif limité et soutient qu'une surveillance efficace – aussi bien des militaires que des acteurs sociopolitiques qui peuvent leur donner un prétexte d'intrusion dans le champ politique – est le facteur déterminant. Au-delà de la non-occurrence du coup d’État, cette explication contribue à la littérature sur les stratégies de survie autoritaire. Cette littérature met un accent exclusif sur la répression, la cooptation et la légitimation ; or, la surveillance s'entremêle avec ces stratégies, et ce sont leurs effets combinés qui créent les conditions de la persistance autoritaire.

Since the end of the Cold War, democracies have sought to create a range of normative and international legal standards intended to reduce the frequency, and legitimacy, of coups. The rise of the anti-coup norm has led to the isolation and punishment of numerous coup-created governments, and evidence suggests it has helped reduce the frequency of coup attempts. However, the norm is contested, and coup leaders often find that the international condemnation they face is countered by quiet acquiescence or active support by international allies. This paper examines the politics of norm contestation around the anti-coup norm by considering the international response to the 2021 coup in Myanmar. It introduces the concept of ‘norm waverers’ and illustrates how committed norm promoters and norm resisters often try to persuade norm waverers – in this case exemplified by ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) – to join their respective camps. International pressure after the Myanmar coup induced ASEAN to take steps to enforce the anti-coup norm. But these ultimately reflected a concern with its own reputation and credibility, rather than any underlying institutional commitment to the norm itself. The result was a shallow institutionalisation of the anti-coup norm.

The storming of the US Capitol building in January 2021 was a presidential attempt at a self-coup. To make the case, this article reviews elements of the Capitol assault and the events leading up to it, in light of the key conceptual components of a self-coup, and how those compare to attributes of other kinds of attacks on governments. The Trump self-coup will then be compared and contrasted empirically to other self-coups perpetrated by leaders. It is found that what separates successful self-coups from those that fail is whether the military backs the undertaking. Thus, a section is included on US military behaviour in response to Trump's attempts to gain military adherence for his political actions.

Proponents of nonviolent tactics often highlight the extent to which they rival arms as effective means of resistance. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, for instance, compare civil resistance favorably to armed insurrection as means of bringing about progressive political change. In Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, Ned Dobos cites their work in support of the claim that similar methods—organized according to Gene Sharp's idea of “civilian-based defense”—may be substituted for regular armed forces in the face of international aggression. I deconstruct this line of pacifist thought by arguing that it builds on the wrong binary. Turning away from a violence-nonviolence dichotomy structured around harmfulness, I look to Richard B. Gregg and Hannah Arendt for an account of nonviolent power defined by non-coercion. Whereas nonviolent coercion in the wrong hands still has the potential to subvert democratic institutions—just as armed methods can—Gregg's and Arendt's conceptions of nonviolent power identify a necessary bulwark against both forms of subversion. The dangers of nonviolent coercion can be seen in the largely nonviolent attempts at civil subversion by supporters of Donald Trump during Trump's attempts to overturn the results of the U.S. presidential election in 2020, while the effectiveness of noncoercive, nonviolent power is illustrated by the resistance of U.S. democratic institutions to resist them.