For several years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, Australia registered a public surplus, and this was generally interpreted as the result of responsible fiscal policy. However, since the outbreak of that crisis, no such fiscal balance has again been attained, giving rise to a range of explanations from the political incapacity of governments to the weak economic behaviour characterising the post-crisis era. Noteworthy in any case is that analysts have failed to cite the importance of a factor that was key to reaching pre-crisis surpluses: the vertiginous growth of private debt. This work argues that it was precisely the intense granting of bank loans and consequent increased demand from the private sector that boosted economic activity and led to the generation of public income sufficient to feed the fiscal surpluses of that period. Indeed, according to the proposals of Wynne Godley, this would have been the only way to register a public surplus in a context of current account deficits, typical of the Australian economy. This paper considers whether Australian private debt played a significant role in achieving fiscal surplus by way of a review of the Australian real estate boom and public accounts from the 1990s onward, also estimating an econometric model of autoregressive vectors to explore the link between these two variables. The results obtained appear to corroborate the hypothesis: severe private borrowing contributed to Australia’s fiscal surpluses. This finding has significant implications for budgetary policy.

Risk-sensitive capital requirements, such as those established in Basel 2/3, and loan loss provisions based on incurred losses or on short-horizon expected losses, increase procyclicality in the banking system. They could, therefore, contribute to fuelling credit bubbles in good times, as rising risks are not properly covered either with capital or provisions, and credit crunches in bad times, as requirements are sharply increased to compensate for the former undercapitalisation and under-provisioning, and banks respond by cutting credit to households and firms. This paper shows that the procyclicality of current and envisaged capital requirements and loan loss provisions is a serious concern. But, at the same time, it can be dealt with using countercyclical macroprudential tools, first, by smoothing minimum capital requirements using a very simple and intuitive formula based on GDP growth and, secondly, by using forward-looking provisions such as the Spanish dynamic provisions, a working macroprudential mechanism for more than a decade and a full lending cycle.