This chapter claims that the operation and success of a leniency programme are premised on a carrot-and-stick approach that is expected to lead to a race for confession, as the highest and sometimes only reward – depending on the design of the leniency programme – is for the first cartel member to defect and cooperate with the authorities. The main pre-requisites to instigate this race for confession are the threat of severe sanctions if a cartel is caught, a high risk of detection of a cartel, and a high degree of transparency and predictability in relation to leniency. The chapter then argues that the early leniency programmes of the United States and the European Union have been revised with these pre-requisites in mind. To illustrate the importance of the theory, this chapter than evaluates the most recent version of the respective leniency programmes. The chapter finishes with some thoughts on the similarities and differences between the two leniency programmes.

This chapter introduces one of the more recent leniency programmes in Asia. Due to the dual enforcement structure, the Philippines has developed two different leniency programmes, one administered by the Philippine Competition Commission and one by the Office for Competition of the Department of Justice (DOJ-OFC). Whereas the latter is only applicable in criminal proceedings, the former applies to administrative, criminal and civil proceedings. The chapter argues that both leniency programmes are generous. However, discretionary powers of the enforcement agencies and the possibility of carving employees out of the leniency application diminish the attractiveness of leniency programmes. Uncertainty about the outcome of a leniency application has, in general, not been well accepted by cartel participants. It can therefore be predicted that, no matter how generous the leniency programmes are, there will be no race to the enforcement agencies’ doors.

Competition law sanctions in Japan are described after first dividing the issues into cartels and non-cartels. Regarding non-cartels, although the 2009 Amendment introduced administrative fine systems, there are only a few orders, arguably because the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) tends to avoid orders that addressees would be likely to contest in the courts. As a result, the JFTC stresses the importance of advocacy instead of frequently enforcing the law. In contrast, regarding cartels, the JFTC has repeatedly issued administrative fine orders. The 1977 Amendment introduced the fine system against cartels, and the 2005 Amendment introduced a leniency system. If the violator is either a repeat offender (recidivism) or a cartel ringleader, the fine becomes 1.5 times higher (if both, 2.0 times higher). There are no fining guidelines. Thus far, the sanctions related to cartels seem to work effectively; quite a few cartels seem to have been deterred. The chapter also describes the framework of the 2019 amendment that took effect in December 2020.