Can smart containment policies crowd out private efforts at social distancing? We analyse this question from the perspective of network formation theory. We focus in particular on the role of externalities in social distancing choices. We also look at how these choices are affected by factors such as the agents’ risk perception, the speed of the policy intervention, the structure of the underlying network and the presence of strategic complementarities. We argue that crowding out is a problem when the probability that an outbreak may spread undetected is relatively high (either because testing is too infrequent or because tests are highly inaccurate). This is also the case where the choice of relaxing social distancing generates the largest negative externalities. Simulations on a real-world network suggest that crowding out is more likely to occur when, in the absence of interventions, face-to-face contacts are perceived to carry relatively high risk.

Under dynamic efficiency, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme helps the current generation of retirees but hurts future generations because they are forced to save via a return-dominated scheme. Abandoning it is deemed welfare-improving but typically not for all generations. But what if agents are present-biased (hence, undersave for retirement) and the “paternalistically motivated forced savings” component of a PAYG scheme motivated its existence in the first place? This paper shows it is possible to transition from such a PAYG scheme on to a higher return, mandated fully-funded scheme; yet, no generation is hurt in the process. The results inform the debate on policy design of pension systems as more and more policy makers push for the transition to take place but are forced to recognize that current retirees may get hurt along the way.

Many have depicted a steady rise in lifestyle politics. Individuals are increasingly using everyday life choices about consumption, transportation, or modes of living to address political, environmental, or ethical issues. While celebrated by some as an expansion of political participation, others worry this trend may be detrimental for democracy, for instance, by reducing citizens to consumers. Implicit in this common critique is the notion that lifestyle politics will replace, rather than coexist with or lead to, other forms of political participation. We provide the first detailed longitudinal analysis to test these hypotheses. Using unique panel data from 1538 politically active individuals from the Flemish region of Belgium (2017–18), we demonstrate that over time, lifestyle politics functions as a gateway into institutionalized and non-institutionalized modes of political participation and that this relationship is mediated by individuals’ increased political concerns.

Research suggests that adult children are less likely to provide care to community-dwelling parents when beds in residential care settings are more widely available. The underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Drawing on data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) on 1,214 impaired parent–child dyads from 12 countries, we find that adult children are less likely to provide care in countries where beds in residential care settings are more widely available because (a) parents’ care needs are less severe in such countries (out-selection hypothesis) and (b) adult children and impaired parents are less likely to share a household in such countries (in-selection hypothesis). Finally (c), after taking these two factors into account, adult children remain less likely to provide care in countries where beds in residential care settings are more widely available (diffusion of responsibility hypothesis). Plausibly, being able to rely on residential care undermines adult children's sense of urgency to step in and provide care to their parents.

This paper uses the old Keynesian representative agent model developed by Roger E. A. Farmer [Expectations, Employment and Prices. New York: Oxford University Press (2010)] to answer two questions: (1) Do increased government purchases crowd out private consumption? (2) Do increased government purchases reduce unemployment? Farmer compared permanent tax-financed expenditure paths and showed that the answer to (1) was yes and the answer to (2) was no. We generalize his result to temporary bond-financed paths of government purchases that are similar to the actual path that occurred during WWII. We find that a temporary increase in government purchases does crowd out private consumption expenditure as in Farmer. However, in contrast to Farmer's experiment, we find that a temporary increase in government purchases can also reduce unemployment.

Financial support and practical help between older parents and their middle-aged children vary greatly among the regions of Europe. Northern and Western Europe is characterised by a high likelihood of practical help to and financial transfers from parents, while in Southern and Eastern Europe these kinds of support are much less likely. Financial transfers to parents show an almost opposite distribution, with more children supporting a parent in Southern and Eastern welfare regimes. Using the second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe encompassing 14 European countries conducted in 2006–07, these country differences can be linked to different social policies. Controlling for different aspects of country composition in terms of individual characteristics and family structures impacting on intergenerational support, it was found that the more services and transfers provided publicly, the more people aged 50 or more years helped their older parents sporadically, and the less monetary support they provided. On the other hand, generous public transfers enabled parents aged 64 or more years to support their offspring financially. Thus, neither ‘crowding in’ nor ‘crowding out’, but a modification of private transfers depending on public transfers and vice versa is found, suggesting a specialisation of private and public support.

Dependent older people are predominantly cared for by family members, mostly partners and children, but not every parent in need is cared for by a child, and intergenerational care varies widely across Europe. Previous studies have used care regimes to explain these differences, but because of the lack of large comparative surveys, the prevalence of intergenerational care has rarely been related directly to the institutional and cultural context, including state care provision, legal obligations between family members, and societal opinion about the role of the state in elderly care. This paper reports an analysis of variations in intergenerational care among European countries and the reasons for these differences using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Results from logistic multilevel models show that care by children is influenced by the individual characteristics of both parents and children, and by family structures, welfare-state institutions and cultural norms. Intergenerational care is more prevalent in southern and central European countries, where children are legally obligated to support parents in need, and care is perceived as a responsibility of the family, whereas in northern Europe, the wider availability of formal care services enable adult children, particularly daughters, have more choice about their activities and use of time.