Recent research reported evidence that contradicts cumulative prospect theory and the priority heuristic. The same body of research also violates two editing principles of original prospect theory: cancellation (the principle that people delete any attribute that is the same in both alternatives before deciding between them) and combination (the principle that people combine branches leading to the same consequence by adding their probabilities). This study was designed to replicate previous results and to test whether the violations of cumulative prospect theory might be eliminated or reduced by using formats for presentation of risky gambles in which cancellation and combination could be facilitated visually. Contrary to the idea that decision behavior contradicting cumulative prospect theory and the priority heuristic would be altered by use of these formats, however, data with two new graphical formats as well as fresh replication data continued to show the patterns of evidence that violate cumulative prospect theory, the priority heuristic, and the editing principles of combination and cancellation. Systematic violations of restricted branch independence also contradicted predictions of “stripped” prospect theory (subjectively weighted additive utility without the editing rules).

The Allais Paradox, or common consequence effect, has been a standard challenge to normative theories of risky choice since its proposal over 60 years ago. However, neither its causes nor the conditions necessary to create the effect are well understood. Two experiments test the effects of losses and event splitting on the Allais Paradox. Experiment 1 found that the Allais Paradox occurs for both gain and mixed gambles and is reflected for loss gambles produced by reflection across the origin. Experiment 2 found that the Allais Paradox is eliminated by splitting the outcomes even when the probabilities used do not increase the salience of the common consequence. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with Cumulative Prospect Theory, the current leading theory of risky choice. However, the results of Experiment 2 are problematic for Cumulative Prospect Theory and suggest that alternate explanations for the Allais Paradox must be sought.

Previous tests of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) and of the priority heuristic (PH) found evidence contradicting these two models of risky decision making. However, those tests were criticized because they had characteristics that might “trigger” use of other heuristics. This paper presents new tests that avoid those characteristics. Expected values of the gambles are nearly equal in each choice. In addition, if a person followed expected value (EV), expected utility (EU), CPT, or PH in these tests, she would shift her preferences in the same direction as shifts in EV or EU. In contrast, the transfer of attention exchange model (TAX) and a similarity model predict that people will reverse preferences in the opposite direction. Results contradict the PH, even when PH is modified to include a preliminary similarity evaluation using the PH parameters. New tests of probability-consequence interaction were also conducted. Strong interactions were observed, contrary to PH. These results add to the growing bodies of evidence showing that neither CPT nor PH is an accurate description of risky decision making.

We analyze the effects of Price Loss Coverage (PLC), Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC), individual revenue protection insurance (RP), and Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) on the RP coverage level, certainty equivalent, and program payments. The model is calibrated to a representative wheat farm in Mitchell County in Kansas to analyze the effects of various policies. The result highlights that when insurance is framed as an investment, cumulative prospect theory predicts farmers’ coverage decisions accurately at 70%. ARC or PLC program increases the RP coverage level to 75%, but PLC and SCO jointly decrease the RP coverage level to 70%.

This paper introduces a new pension contract which provides a smoothed return for the customer. The new contract protects customers from adverse asset price movements while keeping the potential of positive returns. It has a transparent structure and clear distribution rule, which can be easily understood by the customer. We compare the new contract to two other contracts under Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT); one has a similar product structure but without guarantees and the other provides the same guarantee rate but with a different structure. The results show that the new contract is the most attractive contract for a CPT-maximising customer. Yet, we find different results if we let the customer be an Expected Utility Theory-maximising one. Moreover, this paper presents the static optimal portfolio for an individual customer. The results conform to the traditional pension advice that young people should invest more of their money in risky assets while older people should put more money in less risky assets.

In this paper, we present the full characterization of the iterativity condition for the mean-value principle under the cumulative prospect theory. It turns out that the premium principle is iterative for exactly six pairs of probability distortion functions. Some of the corresponding premium principles are the classical mean-value principle, essential infimum or essential supremum of the random loss. Moreover, from the proof of the main theorem of this paper, it follows that the iterativity of the mean-value principle is equivalent to the iterativity of the generalized Choquet integral.