Electoral boundaries are an integral part of election administration. District boundaries delineate which legislative election voters are eligible to participate in, and precinct boundaries identify, in many localities, where voters cast in-person ballots on Election Day. Election officials are tasked with resolving a tremendously large number of intersections of registered voters with overlapping electoral boundaries. Any large-scale data project is susceptible to errors, and this task is no exception. In two recent close elections, these errors were consequential to the outcome. To address this problem, we describe a method to audit the assignment of registered voters to districts. We apply the methodology to Florida’s voter registration file to identify thousands of registered voters assigned to the wrong state House district, many of which local election officials have verified and rectified. We discuss how election officials can best use this technique to detect registered voters assigned to the wrong electoral boundary.

After seeking a “manageable standard” to apply to claims of partisan gerrymandering for over three decades, the Supreme Court has finally given up the chase, ruling that such claims are nonjusticiable. What is to be done? An extended history of successful congressional action suggests that the legislative pathway is more practical than often believed. Statutory requirements also make it possible to consider a broader suite of districting objectives. This paper presents a flexible new software and a framework for evaluating the practical implications of explicit objectives. I apply this approach to the conditions last required by Congress, generating equipopulous, contiguous, and compact districts. Among these conditions, the formal definition of compactness has proven contentious. Does it matter? I contrast the representation of the political parties and of racial and ethnic minorities under plans optimized according to 18 different definitions of compactness. On these grounds, the definitions are markedly consistent. These methods may be extended to alternative districting objectives and criteria.

Computers hold the potential to draw legislative districts in a neutral way. Existing approaches to automated redistricting may introduce bias and encounter difficulties when drawing districts of large and even medium-sized jurisdictions. We present a new algorithm that can neutrally generate legislative districts without indications of bias that are contiguous, balanced and relatively compact. The algorithm does not show the kinds of bias found in prior algorithms and is an advance over previously published algorithms for redistricting because it is computationally more efficient. We use the new algorithm to draw 10,000 maps of congressional districts in Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas. We find that it is unlikely that the number of majority-minority districts we observe in the Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas congressional maps of these states would happen through a neutral redistricting process.