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  • Chapter 7 - Virtues Suspect and Sublime

  • Edited by Esther Engels Kroeker, Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium, Willem Lemmens, Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium
  • Book:
    Hume's <I>An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals</I>
    Published online:
    08 January 2021
    Print publication:
    07 January 2021, pp 134-153

  • Summary

    The seventh section of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is full of interesting puzzles. Why is courage treated here, among the virtues immediately agreeable to self, when it is useful to both its possessor and others? Why do so many of the virtues listed here seem like vices? And why does Hume linger on those virtues of which he seems the most suspicious? This chapter attempts to answer these questions. First, I outline the structure of the section and explain its oddities in more detail. These oddities reflect Hume’s ambivalence about some of the virtues immediately agreeable to self. Second, I argue for the importance of the aesthetic concept of the sublime for his treatment of these virtues. Appreciating this importance can illuminate some of the oddities. Finally, I argue that, although Hume believes that our attraction to these virtues needs correction, this correction cannot consist merely in judging these virtues against the standard of useful virtues. Instead, the correction requires another virtue immediately agreeable to self – delicacy of taste.