Although the additional marks of intentionality discussed in this chapter are not essential for intentionality, when applied to powers they illuminate various aspects of the nature of powers and help justify the Physical Intentionality Thesis. The additional marks of intentionality include two linguistic marks (referential opacity, lack of truth import), unique intentional objects (the object of directedness could be one of a kind), impossible intentional objects (directedness toward an impossible object), extrinsicness (the object of directedness is extrinsic to the directed state), direction of causation (the object causes the directed state), and direction of fit (directed states have a particular fit in relation to their objects). The chapter’s penultimate section discusses three objections: that physical intentionality is mysterious, that physical intentionality is not sufficiently like mental intentionality, and that powers are directed toward nonexistent manifestations. Lastly, the chapter presents reasons why advocates of both the Universals Model and the Neo-Humean Model of modality should be open to assigning directedness and physical intentionality to properties.

Having examined the judgment crucial to the hylomorphically structured act of choice, this chapter turns to the act of choice itself, which is a volition. It does not yet offer an account of choice’s hylomorphic structure but lays important groundwork for doing so in Chapter 5 by shedding light on Aquinas’s general account of volition and its dependence on judgment. It first argues that a volition differs from judgment because it involves a world-to-mind rather than mind-to-world direction of fit. It then examines how volition depends on judgment. Aquinas himself characterizes judgment as the formal as well as the final cause of volition. The chapter suggests that these are two descriptions of one and the same dependence relation: judgment orders volition to an end, which makes it a final cause, and in so doing it also determines the volition’s kind, which makes it a formal cause. The last two sections deal with Aquinas’s view that the will “moves itself.” They argue that this does not imply any freedom of the will to operate independently of reason. In short, the chapter advocates a strongly intellectualist account of the will’s freedom.