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  • 5 - Disaster Responses

  • Bas van Bavel, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands, Daniel R. Curtis, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Jessica Dijkman, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands, Matthew Hannaford, University of Lincoln, Maïka de Keyzer, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, Eline van Onacker, Tim Soens, Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium
  • Book:
    Disasters and History
    Published online:
    06 October 2020
    Print publication:
    22 October 2020, pp 105-122
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  • Summary

    Disasters break with normal routines and so the responses to disasters often require exceptional policies and unusual mobilization of people, know-how, capital, and goods. However, even exceptional interventions and measures are still conditioned by the institutional, social, and cultural layout of the society in question. Moreover, disaster responses are often – though not always – inspired by the memory of reacting to similar challenges in the past. Chapter 5 opens with a discussion of the coordination of disaster responses, with a particular emphasis on the role of ‘experts’ and ‘expertise’ and the importance of learning from disaster. Subsequently, the question is raised as to why responses were not always as effective as they could have been, and why societies do not automatically adapt their infrastructure or organization in appropriate ways to prevent the recurrence of disaster. In explaining the differing directions of disaster responses, we highlight two crucial variables revealed by history: social inequality and institutional rigidity.