Signal detection theory (SDT) was developed to analyze the behavior of a single judge but also can be used to analyze decisions made by organizations or other social systems. SDT quantifies the ability to distinguish between signal and noise by separating accuracy of the detection system from response bias—the propensity to over-warn (too many false positives) or under-warn (too many misses). We apply SDT techniques to national and state-level data sets to analyze the ability of the child welfare services systems to detect instances of child maltreatment. Blacks have higher rates of referral and the system is less accurate for them than for Whites or Hispanics. The incidence of false positives—referrals leading to unsubstantiated findings—is higher for Blacks than for other groups, as is the incidence of false negatives—children for whom no referral was made but who are in fact neglected or abused. The rate of true positives–children for whom a referral was made and for whom the allegation was substantiated–is higher for Blacks. Values of d′ (signal strength) are roughly the same for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics but there are pronounced group differences in C (a measure of the location of the decision threshold). Analyses show that the child welfare services system treats Blacks differently from Hispanics and Whites in ways that cannot be justified readily in terms of objective measures of group differences. This study illustrates the potential for JDM techniques such as SDT to contribute to understanding of system-level decision making processes.

Existing literature has analysed the relationship between electoral systems and either corruption or satisfaction with democracy (SWD) focussing on the traditional distinction between majoritarian and proportional systems. This paper, instead, investigates if and how specific aspects of electoral systems moderate the negative effects of corruption perceptions on SWD. We argue that two mechanisms act simultaneously but at different levels. The first mechanism is the relationship between voters and the national government, while the second links single representatives to their constituents. We advance conditional hypotheses that postulate an attenuating effect of disproportionality and a reinforcing impact of personal vote. Empirical results from 35 elections in 33 democracies, using both individual and aggregate-level data, confirm the research hypotheses. More disproportional electoral systems weaken the impact of citizens’ perceived corruption on their democratic satisfaction, while this is strengthened by systems in which the ballot control is mostly in the hand of the voters.