Every country must allocate final decision-making authority over different issues/subjects within its boundaries. Historically, many scholars working on this topic implicitly assumed that identifying the features providing entities with justified claims for authority and the entities possessing those features would also identify which groups should have which powers (or vice versa). However, many candidate allocative principles select multiple entities as candidates for some sub-state authority and yet fail to explain which powers each should possess. Further work must explain which groups should possess which powers when and what to do when two groups can make equally-valid authority claims using the same principle. Subsidiarity, the principle under which authority should presumptively belong to the entity representing those ‘most affected’ by its exercise and capable of addressing underlying problems, is one of the few principles focused on identifying which groups should have which powers. Unfortunately, subsidiarity alone does not provide guidance on many issues/subjects. Useful subsidiarity-related guidance relies on balancing underlying justificatory interests, which do the real allocative work. Another allocative principle remains necessary. A deflationary account of subsidiarity’s allocative potential nonetheless provides insights into how to articulate a new principle and accounts of subsidiarity that can fulfill other moral roles.

In 1975, the Bourassa government received legal advice that the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement exceeded provincial jurisdiction. Legal counsel advised the constitutionality of the Agreement be secured through formal constitutional amendment. No such amendment was sought. Based on authorized access to Premier Bourassa’s archived dossier on the Agreement’s negotiation, this article sets out the following: 1) why the provincial government sought to encroach on federal jurisdiction; 2) the strategic means employed to insulate the Agreement from s. 91(24) litigation; and 3) provincial negotiators’ views on how judges would approach the Agreement going forward. This article confirms theoretical expectations about when governments might coordinate to transgress federalism’s division of powers: a high probability that courts would find a transgression occurred, and a high political cost should governments not coordinate on a transgression strategy.

Democracy and federalism are commonly viewed as complementary components of a political system. Conversely, a long-standing discourse claims the incompatibility of inevitable intergovernmental coordination in federalism with democracy, the former being viewed as an impediment or disruption to democratic governing. However, neither are the two inherently compatible nor inevitably incongruous. Instead, research and practice of democratic federations show that their relationship is one of multiple tensions. These may generate conflicts and impasses, yet can equally prove to be productive. To delineate these tensions, but also how different federal systems deal with them, this article examines federalism and democracy as two discrete, but interdependent institutional dimensions. Building upon this framework, we depict variants of coupling between institutions of federalism and democracy-based on selected cases. We demonstrate that particular modes of multilevel governance and intergovernmental relations are essential for linking the logics of federalism and democracy in loosely coupled, flexible patterns. Moreover, federal democracies can effectively cope with these tensions by continuously balancing power established in the two institutional dimensions.

This article examines the division of powers established in a number of constitutional projects presented during the First Mexican Empire (1821–3). The essay rejects the idea, present in much recent historiography, that constitutional debate in Mexico was exclusively shaped by the experience of Spanish government. Instead it argues that the empire's politicians drew on a wide range of theories, ideas and examples from other constitutional systems.