This article studies the economic and social rights of people with disabilities in times of armed conflict. While hostilities prevent them from accessing the essential goods and services that they rely on to enjoy these rights, the topic has attracted little attention to date. Calling upon international human rights law, the article applies the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, with a view to complementing the provisions of international humanitarian law. It focuses on the requirements above the provision of medical care and examines the legal obligations attached to economic and social rights.

This article argues that the lockdown imposed in Sudan due to the COVID-19 pandemic has seriously affected the livelihood of vulnerable populations and their right to live a dignified life. It explores how emergency measures were aimed at containing the spread of the pandemic. The article argues that these measures have seriously affected the enjoyment of core economic and social rights, particularly in the context of a weak legislative framework of social protection. It concludes by arguing that Sudan's transitional government is not subject to parliamentary scrutiny and exercises legislative and executive powers that are de facto illegitimate, as they are not subject to review by the courts and because of the current suspension of constitutional organs and governance structures. This incomplete governance structure is concerning from a rule of law perspective and has prevented scrutiny of COVID-19 emergency measures, particularly those affecting the basic rights of vulnerable groups.

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis courts and rights took a backseat to demands of markets and international financial institutions for austerity. Deference and judicial restraint were prevalent in austerity litigation across various European jurisdictions. This article argues that the traditional view of deference to political branches on socio-economic rights should be revised in our political-economic context. Drawing on the work of German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck on representation failures of democratic institutions in our neoliberal era, the article argues that law’s abnegation in this sphere has the effect of securing and legitimising neoliberal hegemony and serves the interests of owners of financial capital. Deference in order to avoid judicial overreach does not entail deference to democracy as legislatures have come to view financial markets as their constituency alongside the general citizenry. As public finances have become marketised, deference to legislatures amounts to deference to markets. Judicial minimalism creates not more democracy but a specific set of winners and losers. In light of severe representation failures where legislatures become tools of market justice we might, subject to various caveats, view a more active judicial role as democracy-enhancing and as a potential counterweight in favour of social justice.

This article argues that a new understanding of the indivisibility of human rights has emerged through the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The CRPD has blurred the distinction between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic and social rights, on the other. After showing how this distinction has been blurred in the Convention, the article critically analyses the impact this has had on the concept of indivisibility, as well as its consequences for international human rights law more generally. It shows that there is now a shift away from a preoccupation with different categories of rights and towards concern for the real and actual enjoyment of human rights.

The 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change is relevant to human rights law, not for what it says about human rights— which is next to nothing—but for what it says about the need to address the risk of climate change taking global temperatures above 1.5 or 2 °C. The Agreement could work, or it could fail by a large margin, but those who want to influence the outcome can still do so. That includes the human rights community. Since climate change is plainly a threat to human rights, how should the UN human rights institutions respond? Should they use their existing powers of oversight to focus attention on how States parties implement (or fail to implement) commitments made in the Paris Agreement? Or should they recognize a right to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment? Either choice would represent a significant contribution to the debate on human rights and climate change, giving humanity as a whole a voice that at present is scarcely heard.

When the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) released a letter in early 2012 addressing the financial and economic crises, it was long overdue. Finally, and around four and a half years after the crises began, the body responsible for monitoring those rights that had been most severely impacted had spoken. But what had been said? This article examines the alterations to the doctrine of non-retrogression that the 2012 Letter instigated. It does so by reference to the ‘Business as Usual’ and ‘accommodation’ theories of emergency response. The Letter to States is argued to have taken the Committee away from an approach to non-retrogression that treated times of normality and emergency in a similar way, and towards an approach that allows derogation-style deviations from the Covenant. This, it is argued, could have detrimental effects for the protection of economic and social rights. The difficulties in applying such an approach are considered.

The Indian Constitution embraces economic and social rights as directive principles of state policy, ostensibly insulated from judicial review. The Supreme Court's interpretation of traditional civil and political rights to include economic and social guarantees has been praised by academics and activists keen to advance the cause of justiciable economic and social rights. In recent commentary, however, the extent to which the court's jurisprudence furthers the goal of increasing access to goods such as health care, housing, food and water for India's poor, is questioned. This article reconsiders the court's record in this area. It suggests that a more realistic assessment of the court's jurisprudence is necessary and draws on the South African experience of economic and social rights adjudication to argue for more serious engagement with factors that inform the level of judicial activism or restraint applied in the cases.