Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, both viral infection and the corresponding economic turmoil have wreaked havoc across the globe, highlighting the imperative function of the state as a social protection provider. The pandemic has seemingly created favourable political circumstances for rapidly expanding social protection, but its influences on public welfare attitudes remain unclear. In this study, I argue that the impact of pandemic-driven economic risk is too limited to spur strong public support for social protection. The employed empirical analyses using panel data collected in South Korea show that unemployment induced by the pandemic is conducive to higher degrees of individual support for social protection measures, but the impact is only short-lived. Further analyses show that, once individuals are re-employed and as the time spent in economic difficulties becomes more distant, personal unemployment experiences are no longer positively associated with support for social protection. Finally, pandemic-induced unemployment experiences have a lasting impact primarily on young adults. The evidence therefore suggests that significant institutional changes in the welfare state are hard to achieve by solely relying on the impact of economic risk.

This article investigates how unemployment risk within households affects voting for the radical right. The authors contribute to recent advances in the literature that have highlighted the role of economic threat for understanding the support of radical-right parties. In contrast to existing work, the authors do not treat voters as atomistic individuals; they instead investigate households as a crucial site of preference formation. Combining largescale labor market data with comparative survey data, they confirm the expectations of their theoretical framework by demonstrating that the effect of occupational unemployment risk on radical-right support is strongly conditioned by household-risk constellations. Voting for the radical right is a function not only of a voter’s own risk, but also of his or her partner’s risk. The article provides additional evidence on the extent to which these effects are gendered and on the mechanisms that link household risk and party choice. The results imply that much of the existing literature on individual risk exposure potentially underestimates its effect on political behavior due to the neglect of multiplier effects within households.

This study employs multiple regression models based on DeFries and Fulker (1985), and a large sample of twins, to assess heritability in attitudes towards economic risk, and the extent to which this heritability differs between males and females. Consistent with Cesarini et al. (2009), it is found that attitudes towards risk are moderately heritable, with about 20 percent of the variation in these attitudes across individuals being linked to genetic differences. This value is less than one-half the estimates reported by Zyphur et al. (2009) and Zhong et al. (2009). While females are more risk averse than males, there is no evidence that heritability in attitudes towards risk differs between males and females. Even though heritability is shown to be important to economic risk-taking, the analyses suggest that multivariate studies of the determinants of attitudes towards risk which to not take heritability into consideration still provide reliable estimates of the partial effects of other key variables, such as gender and educational attainment.

The propensity to take risk underpins a wide variety of decision-making behavior, ranging from common ones such as asking for directions and trying out a new restaurant to more substantial economic decisions involving, for instance, one's investment or career. Despite the fundamental role of risk attitude in the economy, its genetic basis remains unknown. Using an experimental economics protocol combined with a classical twin strategy, we provide the first direct evidence of the heritability of economic risk attitude, at 57%. We do not find a significant role for shared environmental effects, a common observation in behavioral genetics that is contrary to commonly held views in economics. Our findings complement recent neuroeconomic studies in enhancing the understanding of the neurobiological basis of risk taking.

Trade restrictions stemming from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) have created a situation in which rare and attractive bird species command high prices on international pet markets. Most of these species are of tropical or subtropical origin, and many are amenable to captive breeding. Hence, the possibility of exporting birds under CITES provisions for the export of captive-raised animals is under debate in many countries around the world. If export bans are replaced by systems of export permits, the economics of avicultural markets will govern the magnitude, timing, and nature of the impacts of the bird trade. Avicultural economics, however, is little studied, and the long-term economic viabilities of exotic pet markets are poorly understood. In order to elucidate these, a dynamic model of an avicultural market was constructed, based on descriptive information. Model simulations showed that the high prices commanded by sought-after bird species tended to bring about oversupply and rapid price decline. Short-lived, fecund species produced a rapid, sharp pulse of oversupply; longer-lived species produced more persistent but less acute conditions of oversupply. The present high prices for protected bird species may be regarded as a potential source of windfall profits, or as a factor that might be manipulated to discourage the poaching and smuggling of wild birds. If export-oriented aviculture is considered as a component of strategies for diversification of agriculture and promotion of sustainable development, it is important that decision-makers factor in the likelihood of significant declines in bird prices and that they consider the risk of accidental species introductions that is inherent in holding large exotic-bird populations.

Winter legume cover crops are receiving increasing attention from agronomists and farmers as a source of nitrogen for summer crops. While agronomists are continually providing new technical information on using legumes as a nitrogen source, little is known on the economics of their use. Previous economic research on legume cover crops has focused mainly on budgeting analysis. In the present work, a twofactorial experiment was designed to test the use of legumes as a nitrogen source for corn (Zea mays L.) in north Georgia. The first factor was winter cover crop with treatments being crimson clover (Trifolium incarnatum L.), hairy vetch (Vicia villosa Roth), wheat (Triticum aestivum L.), and no cover crop or winter fallow. The second factor was nitrogen (N) fertilizer applied at five different rates: 0, 25, 50, 100, or 200 pounds per acre. For each combination of the two factors, mean yield and yield variance were determined. Results indicated that legume cover crops increased both average corn yield and yield variance. The greater yield variance from the use of legume cover crops increases economic risk. Risk-averse farmers must be compensated for increased profit variance by higher average profits. A safety first method was used to evaluate the tradeoff between average profit and profit variance for the risk-averse individual The results showed that hairy vetch with 50 pounds of N per acre was the best combination of cover crop and fertilizer rate for risk-neutral farmers. For risk-averse farmers, hairy vetch without any nitrogen fertilizer is preferred.