This paper argues that output can respond to public education spending in a delayed and persistent manner through human capital accumulation. We refer to this as a “time-release” response, reflecting that the output response grows as students exposed to increased expenditures sequentially enter the labor market. We first develop and calibrate a stochastic overlapping generations model to formalize the propagation of spending shocks over a long time horizon. We then empirically explore this time-release aspect of shocks to government education expenditures on output using US state-level data for the period 1963–2016 and a panel structural vector autoregression methodology. Consistent with the model, our empirical results show that the dynamic response of output to shocks to government education expenditures is positive, significant, and long-lasting.

Proceeding population aging might fuel generational conflicts about the distribution of welfare state resources in the future, but the existing evidence on the extent of generational cleavages in attitudes towards the welfare state is mixed. We argue that these mixed findings are partially related to an underestimation of trade-offs on the level of individual preferences. Using novel data from a survey experiment conducted in eight Western European countries, we show that age-related self-interest is an important determinant of social policy preferences. When elderly respondents are confronted with hypothetical cutbacks in pensions, they are much less likely to support additional education spending. However, we also find evidence for a mediating effect of social trust: high-trusting elderly individuals are more likely to support education spending – contrary to their narrow self-interest – than low-trusting elderly.

Although it is commonly believed that democracy promotes public services such as education, efforts have just started to evaluate empirically how the recent trend of democratization affects education services in the developing world. This article reports on the first regionwide investigation in East Asia. By studying the effects of democracy on multiple education indicators in a time-series-cross-section dataset of eight East Asian countries/political entities, the article examines whether democratic governments increase education spending and access and which social groups are favored in the process. The statistical results, which are corroborated by findings from two case studies, show that democracy plays a progressive role in promoting education spending and school enrollment at the basic level in East Asia.

We develop a theoretical model where child labour results from a household's trade-off between sending a child to school or to work. Education is considered as a risky investment, since the survival of the child is not certain. We explore the effects of public expenditure on education and health on child labour, specifying a transmission mechanism for each kind of spending. On the one hand, we establish that health expenditure reduces child labour all the more as child mortality rate is high. On the other hand, a moderate aversion to risk is a necessary condition for education expenditure to reduce child labour. Our theoretical results are empirically validated on panel data from 66 developing countries between 1985 and 2000.