There is no one clear path to scholarly success. A productive scholar might be raised by academic parents, or not; might have previously been an educator, or not; might have had a postdoctoral experience, or not; might be in a writing group, or not; might work extreme hours, or not; might be married to another academic, or not … Still, productive scholars share common means for finding their pathways to scholarly success, including curiosity, risk-taking, discovering one’s element, accumulating advantages, offsetting structural disadvantages, and keeping scholarly activities on one’s mind. Curiosity and risk taking help move scholars away from tired, well-worn topics toward the investigation of innovative and important topics, where they discover their element, carve out a unique research agenda, and make a name for themselves. Budding scholars seek advantages, such as research-rich institutions and influential mentors, that multiply and accumulate, smoothing the pathway to scholarly success. Some productive scholars face potentially debilitating structural barriers that could block their path but find ways to rise above the barriers and succeed regardless. Pathways to success are long, and productive scholars stay the course by keeping their scholarly work foremost on their minds.

This chapter introduces the concept of grammar of a particular language. The basic units of grammar in Chinese are introduced in order to underline the distinguishing characteristics of Chinese grammar. By comparing Chinese with English, the chapter demonstrates that Chinese words have no form changes in sentences regardless of quantity or tense; thus, the relationship between words plays an important role in determining their parts of speech.

This chapter introduces simple sentences in terms of their components and structures. The functions of a simple sentence are explained. Special simple sentences without a subject or a predicate are introduced by their grammatical features and functions.

In GC II 3, Aristotle gives an initial justification of three theses: (i) that there are four primary bodies; (ii) that these are earth, air, fire, and water; and (iii) that each is associated with two primary differentiae. Despite his laconic presentation, Aristotle offers an impressive variety of justifications for his main contentions: he appeals to combinatorial mathematics, to what is “in accordance with argument,” to empirical observation, and to his predecessors. I consider whether this chapter indicates that the primary bodies are not really elements; whether the “apparent simple bodies” Aristotle mentions are the primary bodies or something else; and how to understand the “fiery” and “airy” things that are not fire and air (respectively) but somehow like them. I find that the primary bodies are indeed genuine elements of sensible bodies for Aristotle; that the “apparent simple bodies” are the everyday counterparts of the elemental bodies; and that the contrast between fiery and airy things and fire and air is a contrast between the elemental bodies and their everyday counterparts.

The chapter is concerned with Kuhnian revolutions in the way that they were originally conceived and also according to Kuhn’s later writings. In particular I analyze a recent proposal by Brad Wray that the switch from using atomic weight to order the elements, to using atomic number, represents a Kuhnian revolution either in the original and classic sense or in terms of a change in the scientific lexicon. The chapter also considers how the literature on the dual sense of the term ‘element’ bears on this discussion and the manner in which the discovery of isotopes of chemical elements were accommodated into the periodic table. Finally, Kuhn’s no overlap principle is examined. This is first carried out in the context in which Kuhn introduced the principle, to characterize how the meaning of the term planet changed in the course of the Copernican revolution. The no overlap principle is then applied to the change in the meaning of the term element which took place during Wray’s proposed atomic number revolution. I argue that the two historical cases are not analogous and that the element case cannot therefore be considered as a revolution in Kuhn’s revised lexical sense.