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1 results

  • 4 - Nuclear Proliferation

  • Allison Carnegie, Columbia University, New York, Austin Carson, University of Chicago
  • Book:
    Secrets in Global Governance
    Published online:
    05 June 2020
    Print publication:
    18 June 2020, pp 81-150

  • Summary

    We argue in Chapter 4 that states often seek to reveal intelligence about other states’ violations of international rules and laws but are deterred by concerns about revealing the sources and methods used to collect that intelligence. Properly equipped nuclear international organizations can mitigate these dilemmas, however, by analyzing and acting on sensitive information while protecting it from wide dissemination. Using new data on intelligence disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency and analysis of the full universe of nuclear proliferation cases, we demonstrate that strengthening the agency’s intelligence protection capabilities led to greater intelligence sharing and fewer suspected nuclear facilities. However, our theory suggests that this solution gives informed states a subtle form of influence and is in tension with the normative goal of international transparency.