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1 results

  • 1 - Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Skepticism about Rules and Meaning

  • Edited by Claudine Verheggen, York University, Toronto
  • Book:
    Kripke's <i>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language</i> at 40
    Published online:
    22 February 2024
    Print publication:
    08 February 2024, pp 14-34

  • Summary

    According to the “standard interpretation” of WRPL (favored by Wright, Boghossian, McGinn, and Goldfarb), the epistemological argumentation and metaphysical conclusion of the skeptic’s ruminations in Chapter 2 can be reconciled by viewing the overtly epistemological argumentation as merely a “dramatic device” for developing a fundamentally metaphysical argument. The epistemological challenge – to defend your claim that you know that you mean addition and your claim that you are justified in answering “5” – takes place under conditions in which you are granted ideal epistemological access to all of the sorts of facts capable of constituting your meaning addition by “+.” In this chapter, I will defend the standard interpretation against a recent attack launched by Hannah Ginsborg, and I’ll argue that the standard interpretation fits the text of Chapter 2 of WRPL more smoothly than Ginsborg’s alternative proposal. I’ll also make some comments on Ginsborg’s notion of “primitive normativity.”