This Note examines the effects of Title IX’s equal treatment framework on female collegiate athletes in the context of the female athlete triad. It describes the shortcomings of Title IX’s equal treatment approach and its deleterious effects on the health of female student athletes. It argues for the adoption of the special treatment approach as a remedy.

Lines at the polls raise the cost of voting and can precipitate unequal treatment of voters. Research on voting lines is nonetheless hampered by a fundamental measurement problem: little is known about the distribution of time voters spend in line prior to casting ballots. We argue that early, in-person voter check-in times allow us identify individuals who waited in line to vote. Drawing on election administrative records from two General Elections in Florida—1,031,179 check-ins from 2012 and 1,846,845 from 2016—we find that minority voters incurred disproportionately long wait times in 2012 and that in-person voters who waited excessively in 2012 had a slightly lower probability—approximately one percent—of turning out to vote in 2016, ceteris paribus. These individuals also had slightly lower turnout probabilities in the 2014 Midterm Election, ceteris paribus. Our results draw attention to the ongoing importance of the administrative features of elections that influence the cost of voting and ultimately the extent to which voters are treated equally.

The Authors apologise for two errors within their published Article. These appear on pages 391 and 416.

Article 6 Treaty on European Union sets out two sources of fundamental rights in the EU—the Charter and the general principles of EU law—without specifying a hierarchy between them. Even though the Charter became binding over a decade ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is yet to clarify unequivocally how these two sources interact. In this article I argue based upon the relevant legal framework that the Charter ought to replace the general principles it enshrines. This leaves a role for general principles in the incorporation of new and additional rights into the EU legal framework. Such an approach is necessary to ensure that the Charter achieves its aims in enhancing the visibility of the rights protected by EU law, while also providing the impetus for more coherent rights protection within the EU. What an extensive survey of CJEU case law in the field of non-discrimination shows, however, is that the CJEU has struggled to let its general principles case law go, potentially hampering the transformative potential of the Charter.

Although fair trial guarantees have always been recognised as constituting an integral aspect of international arbitral proceedings, this has largely been viewed through the lens of civil procedure rather than as a matter of public law and human rights. This state of affairs has further been compounded by the confidential nature of arbitration and the relative scarcity of set aside (annulment) proceedings before the courts of the seat of arbitration on the grounds of unequal treatment, and before human rights bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, it has always been difficult to reconcile contractual freedom and the advantages offered by arbitration with equal treatment and fair trial claims. This article demonstrates the existence of a set of general principles concerning the meaning and content of equal treatment, which are consistent with its commercial (and civil procedure) and human rights dimensions. The basis of this conclusion is Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as consistently interpreted and adapted by local laws and judgments, arbitral statutes and determinations by the European Court of Human Rights.

Since their publication in the 1950s and 1980s respectively, the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 have become a major reference for the application and interpretation of those treaties. The International Committee of the Red Cross, together with a team of renowned experts, is currently updating these Commentaries in order to document developments and provide up-to-date interpretations of the treaty texts. This article highlights key points of interest covered in the updated Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention. It explains the fundamentals of the Convention: the historical background, the personal scope of application of the Convention and the fundamental protections that apply to all prisoners of war (PoWs). It then looks at the timing under which certain obligations are triggered, those prior to holding PoWs, those triggered by the taking of PoWs and during their captivity, and those at the end of a PoW's captivity. Finally, the article summarizes key substantive protections provided in the Third Convention.

The principle of equal treatment is essential to the process of European integration. It is one of the main principles – if not the main principle – driving this process forward. Equal treatment between States and the prohibition to discriminate on grounds of nationality are indeed cornerstones of the European project. Furthermore, the principle of equal treatment is a fundamental right according to which comparable situations must not be treated differently, and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. This fundamental right has also been given more specific expression in a set of Treaty provisions and Directives prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. Precisely because the principle of equal treatment performs several important functions in the EU legal order, it is shaped by several sets of actors: constituent powers, legislature and judiciary. The article first maps out the various functions that the principle of equal treatment fulfills in EU law, placing emphasis on the complexity of the relevant constitutional framework. This sets the floor for a critical discussion on how different institutional visions of the principle may compete, and a reflection of the role of the concept of ‘essence’ to articulate these competing visions.

This article explores the influence of Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the development of EU equal treatment law, with emphasis on forms of discrimination precluded by Council Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, and Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. The author contends that although Articles 20 and 21 are primary measure of EU law, their impact in the development of case law elaborated pursuant to the Directives is relatively muted. This may have stunted the development of jurisprudence on the relationship between Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter, and rules contained in Title VI of the Charter governing its interpretation and application, such as Article 52(3) on the relationship between the Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights, and Article 52(1) on justified limitations. The author forewarns against the emergence of incoherence in the case law in this context, and with respect to the role of Articles 20 and 21 in disputes over the meaning of Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 and calls for fuller reflection on Charter rules in disputes based on an allegation of discrimination.

This article analyzes the idea of a legal right to conscientious refusal for healthcare professionals from a basic legal ethical standpoint, using refusal to perform tasks related to legal abortion (in cases of voluntary employment) as a case in point. The idea of a legal right to conscientious refusal is distinguished from ideas regarding moral rights or reasons related to conscientious refusal, and none of the latter are found to support the notion of a legal right. Reasons for allowing some sort of room for conscientious refusal for healthcare professionals based on the importance of cultural identity and the fostering of a critical atmosphere might provide some support, if no countervailing factors apply. One such factor is that a legal right to healthcare professionals’ conscientious refusal must comply with basic legal ethical tenets regarding the rule of law and equal treatment, and this requirement is found to create serious problems for those wishing to defend the idea under consideration. We conclude that the notion of a legal right to conscientious refusal for any profession is either fundamentally incompatible with elementary legal ethical requirements, or implausible because it undermines the functioning of a related professional sector (healthcare) or even of society as a whole.

This article examines the role of bid prices for determining the fair value of securities in a subsequent squeeze-out appraisal. The recent Takeover Directive includes a legal presumption of a fair bid price under certain prescribed conditions. The author seeks to identify circumstances that may be regarded as a sufficient reason to reverse the fairness presumption and deviate from the consideration offered in a bid when determining the squeeze-out price. Theoretical underpinnings of the preconditions are also presented. Particular interest is paid to the question what significance may be given, when determining the fair squeeze-out price, to the consideration offered in such a voluntary bid that fails to gain acceptance by a qualified majority (90 per cent) of securities targeted.

Courts are frequently confronted with complaints about unequal treatment of various sorts, varying from legislative acts limiting the rights of inheritance of illegitimate children, to unequal taxation criteria for property taxes. The need to assess different cases of unequal treatment against the equality principle places before the courts a difficult task. The equality principle demands that the courts examine the reasonableness and justifiability of each specific case of unequal treatment, however different the subject. In doing so, the courts need to respect both the discretion or freedom of the party that is responsible for the difference in treatment, and the interests of the person or group that is disadvantaged by it. In order to enable the courts to take account of all interests at stake in any relevant equal treatment case, some variation in the intensity of review is indispensable. In some cases, it is appropriate to exercise restraint in assessing the justification for an inequality in treatment, while other cases call for the strictest scrutiny. In this contribution, the various factors that are relevant to the determination of the appropriate level of review are identified on the basis of a comparative study of the case law of the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the US Supreme Court. In addition, a standard is offered to balance intensity-determining factors pointing in different directions.