During Trump’s presidency, “America First,” a slogan once associated with Charles Lindbergh and the America First Committee (AFC) (1940–1941) to prevent US participation in World War II, returned to the center of American political discourse. This chapter argues that the AFC’s anti-interventionist foreign policy and proximity to mimetic fascist groups such as the German Bund is distorted by the labels “isolationist” and “populist.” Instead, by tracing the history of the slogan to the 1880s, this chapter restores the short-lived AFC and more recent iterations since 2016 to the longue durée history of American nativism and nationalism. The slogan “America First” has endured because it offers answers to perennial American questions about national identity and action: both ‘who are we?’ and ‘how should we act in international affairs?’ The chapter defines the America First tradition as an expression of a fascist politics of national identity rooted in American history and not merely a copy of twentieth-century interwar European models. Challenging diffusionist theories of fascism, it contributes to theoretical discussions of fascism as a global, diasporic, and living political tradition.

This chapter explores terrorism, terrorist groups, and potential solutions to terrorism. It discusses conceptual and legal definitions of terrorism. It then provides historical context, describing terrorist waves driven by ideologies such as anarchism, anti-colonialism, New Left perspectives, and various religions. The chapter looks at who becomes a terrorist, taking account of theories of grievance, radicalization, recruitment by terrorist groups, lone wolf terrorism, and foreign fighter recruitment. It considers relationships between regime type and terrorism, examining why democracies, anocracies, and autocracies respectively might be more or less likely to attract terrorist violence, and exploring issues such as media coverage, grievance, and repression. Terrorist tactics and how these might diffuse across groups are discussed, as are terrorist group cooperation and state sponsorship of terrorism. The chapter also looks at the challenges of crafting effective counterterrorism policy, with a focus on deradicalization. It then applies many of these concepts to a quantitative study on whether targeting terrorist group leaders helps stop terrorism, and a case study of al-Qaeda.

Latin America differs from our other cases in crucial ways. It did not suffer as badly from the Great Recession as did many other regions, although it experienced its own crisis when the boom in commodity prices burst. And historically, cultural issues over race and ethnicity had not been as politicized as in Europe and North America. Nevertheless, we see a similar causal process in this region as in our other cases. As regional economies suffered, antagonism towards politics as usual increased. The nature of discontent, however, differed radically depending on the details of the dominant political order it opposed. In Brazil, discontent came to resemble Trumpism, with a focus on cultural issues that had been addressed by the formerly dominant Workers’ Party, while also addressing rampant corruption. In Chile, discontent centered on the elitism of Chile’s democracy, and the institutions that reinforced it, placed insurmountable barriers in the path of political outsiders and insurgent parties; as a result, discontent in Chile manifested as mass contention. This chapter uses analysis of existing datasets (including LAPOP and national election studies) to show how economic concerns, exacerbated by democratic deficits, drove discontent over cultural discontent, corruption, and elitism.

This chapter begins applying the theory to the core cases, starting with Trumpism in the USA and Euroscepticism and Brexit in the United Kingdom. It traces the evolution of the populist radical right in both countries; throughout the process, economic trauma, compounded by inadequate or imprudent political responses to the unfolding crisis, stoked and inflamed cultural tensions. Yet in both cases, discontent failed to break through the political status quo as radical right antecedents like the Tea Party and the UK Independence Party (prior to Farage’s ascension to leadership) failed to embrace their supporters’ cultural radicalism. Only when Trump and Farage began to explicitly connect economics, culture, and politics did radical right populism manage to provoke a rupture. We support these arguments using original survey data in the USA, the British Election Study, and analyses of Trump’s rhetoric.

The German emigrant nation proved strikingly resilient despite the Allies’ global efforts to undermine it. The leadership in many of those states confused the presence of Germans all over the world with a German presence somehow beholden to and shaped by the German nation-state.That was their great miscalculation.The demise of Imperial Germany did not dramatically undermine these communities or undercut their soft forms of power because neither had been Imperial Germany’s creations.As a result, Germans quickly returned to being the United States’ greatest rivals in Latin America and their businesses and communities again were flourishing by the middle of the 1920s.At the same time, however, the creation of German minorities across central and eastern Europe mattered a great deal; contributing to the rise of virulent ethno-nationalism, particularly among a younger generation.Within those new contexts, the global flows of people were now channeled and shaped by ever-more stringent immigration laws in the United States and elsewhere as well as ever-more political refugees from the USSR and the nationalizing Central and Eastern European states.

Chapter 10 provides an overview of all our findings and offers additional avenues of research. We also discuss the many policy implications and political ramifications of group empathy, including what happens when it is lacking in specific contexts. In doing so, we consider the rise of ethnonationalist, far-right politics in the United States and many other parts of the world, and we discuss whether group empathy may counteract xenophobic, exclusionary appeals of populist leaders. The eight-year span of our data collection covers a stark transformation of the American policy landscape as the United States transitioned from Barack Obama’s presidency to Donald Trump’s. This allows us to contemplate how levels of group empathy might have shifted over time within and across racial/ethnic groups in the United States. We further consider how to cultivate group empathy at the societal level, in order to improve intergroup relations and social justice, and how to envision the role of educational experiences such as community engagement in these efforts.

This book explores three contemporary women’s movements in and around Jerusalem’s Sacred Esplanade: Women for the Temple, a messianic Jewish Orthodox women’s movement campaigning for access to Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif; Murabitat, pious Muslim women activists mobilizing for the defense of al-Aqsa Mosque from Jewish claims; and Women of the Wall (WOW), a Jewish feminist organization working against restrictive gender regulations at the Western Wall. Using these cases, the book demonstrates how attention to gender and to women’s engagement in conflict over central sacred places is essential for understanding the intra-communal processes that make contested sacred sites appear increasingly “indivisible” for parties in the inter-communal context. More broadly, the book argues that a gender analysis of contested sacred places enriches and sharpens both our description of the “choreographies” of such sites and our analytical understanding of the contemporary dynamics of conflict in these sites; in particular the processes that give rise to the problem of “indivisibility.”

This chapter opens by exploring how Trump’s self-aggrandizing political masculinization is connected to his racism. As Trump elaborates his identity as a White supremacist strongman, he implies that only he can emasculate brown maculinities through the tools of White ethnonationalism. Trump has also praised and admired despots across the world, preferring the trappings of cold-blooded brutality to the trope of the White civilizer. The chapter goes on to discuss how Latin American leaders have responded discursively to President Trump, as each adopts a particular stance to respond to his supremacist strongman masculinity. The stances of former Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto, for instance, precipitated anxiety about Trump’s political humiliation of Mexico and his gendered humiliation of Peña Nieto. The current president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has opted for a dignified posture, rebuking Trump while championing the revalorization of indigenity, rurality, and the Mexican common folk. Meanwhile, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, President of Brazil, plainly admires and vociferously parrots Trump’s white ethnonationalism, echoing almost word for word the text of Trump’s campaign speeches. These Latin American leaders thus by turns vilify and emulate Trump’s posturing, whether to counter, contain, or amplify the unpredictable power of the elephantine neighbor to the North.