We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 5 considers evidence that disagreements about the jus ad bellum are linked to disagreements about between ‘pacificist’ and ‘interventionist’ strategic cultures ‘extra-legal’ politico-strategic and ethical principles. The chapter describes extra-legal reasoning, particularly in evaluating facts, in UK government statements and writings by eight legal scholars about the lawfulness of military action in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), judges’ opinions in the ICJ cases Nicaragua (1986), Wall (2004), and Congo (2005), and in interviews and a survey with thirty-one UK-based international lawyers. The chapter concludes that lawyers’ extra-legal reasoning and views on lawfulness of force broadly align, on a continuum between pacificists preferring a restrictive jus ad bellum, and interventionists favouring an expansionist approach. But again, there are caveats. Most interventionists accept some legal prohibitions they believe are politically or ethically wrong. Most pacificists accept some justifications they politically or ethically condemn. This suggests most lawyers’ politico-strategic and ethical intuitions act as forms of cognitive biases, shaping but not wholly determining opinions about legal interpretation and the jus ad bellum.
Chapter 3 considers factual uncertainty in the jus ad bellum. It describes how the vagueness described in Chapter 2 can affect factual evidence in the jus ad bellum. Such situations are often chaotic, fast moving, involving actors trying to mislead, and where factual evidence is open to different interpretations. Tests such as necessity, imminence and proportionality require decision-makers to compare multiple forecasts of outcomes if force is used or not. Survey participants evaluating four fictional conflict scenarios, demonstrating how even fictional ‘facts’ elicit varying opinions. The ICJ’s rules of evidence only reduce rather than resolve factual uncertainty. The chapter suggests a second potential explanation for contestation in the jus ad bellum: lawyers resolve factual uncertainties and make forecasts using their politico-strategic and ethical intuitions, forming competing strategic cultures disagreeing about legality of specific cases and the jus ad bellum more generally. Thus ‘restrictivist’ lawyers prefer a ‘pacificist’ strategic culture, seeing little extra-legal justification for force, while ‘expansionist’ lawyers prefer an ‘interventionist’ strategic culture, seeing more such extra-legal justifications.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.