This study extends the extant literature on corporate philanthropy by exploring the indirect effect of physical attractiveness of CEOs on corporate philanthropy under conditional effects of family ownership and control. Recent empirical studies in psychology suggest that egalitarian values are negatively related to physical attractiveness. Based on these findings, we propose that physically attractive CEOs invest less in corporate philanthropic activities than less attractive peers as they have lower egalitarian values. Leveraging upper echelons and stewardship theory, we further consider the moderating impact of family ownership and control on the indirect relationship between the physical attractiveness of a CEO and philanthropy mediated through egalitarianism.

Using new product announcement events made by group member firms in Taiwan, this study examines whether the firms’ multiple network ties within business groups benefit member firms or whether they provide a channel for controlling shareholders to tunnel. We find that the announcement of new products by group member firms has a positive effect on the market value of other, non-announcing group peers. This evidence is consistent with the value-added hypothesis. More importantly, this effect is stronger when member firms are connected via equity ties. Furthermore, we also offer an original analysis of how family control in business groups affects the impact of network ties on value creation. Our results suggest that the controlling family may discount the market value of member firms.

This study examined the combined effect of family ownership and high-discretion organizational slack on the international involvement of Taiwanese firms. Employing a sample of 179 publicly listed high-tech firms in Taiwan over a period of 6 years (2000–2005), we found that firms with high levels of international involvement, that is, a higher degree of internationalization, (i) were not closely held, and (ii) were not excessively controlled by the family. Further, high-discretion organizational slack (indicated by resources that can be deployed in a flexible fashion such as in cash and receivables) moderated the negative relationship between family control and international involvement. This relationship is stronger with a higher level of high-discretion slack. The results support the hypothesis that family control and high-discretion organizational slack negatively influence the decision to internationalize.

This study investigates how family control influences entry mode choice between joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. Based on past studies revealing family-controlled firms’ unique concerns regarding the preservation of socioemotional wealth, the researchers posit that, firms with higher family control respond more drastically to perceived environmental uncertainty when choosing their entry mode. The researchers hypothesize that, when perceiving high environmental uncertainty, firms with higher versus lower family control are more likely to choose joint ventures. However, when perceiving low environmental uncertainty, firms with higher versus lower family control tend to choose wholly owned subsidiaries. The empirical results obtained from a sample of 1,644 investments undertaken by publicly listed companies in Taiwan support the hypotheses.