This article studies how sudden changes in bank credit supply impact economic activity. I identify shocks to bank credit supply based on firms’ aggregate debt composition. I use a model where firms fund production with bonds and loans. In the model, bank shocks are the only type of shock that imply opposite movements in the two types of debt as firms adjust their debt composition to new credit conditions. Bank shocks account for a third of output fluctuations and are predictive of the bond spread.

In some classes of macroeconomic models with financial frictions, an adverse financial shock successfully explains a decrease in real activity but simultaneously induces a stock price boom. The latter theoretical result is not consistent with data from actual financial crises. This study aims to provide a theoretical explanation for both prolonged recessions and stock price declines. I develop a simple macroeconomic model featuring a banking sector, financial frictions, and R&D-based endogenous growth. Both the analytical and numerical investigations show that endogenous R&D investment and a shock hindering banks’ financial intermediary function can be key to generating both a prolonged recession and a drop in firms’ stock prices.

We develop an extended real business cycle model with financially constrained firms and non-pledgeable intangible capital. Based on a model-consistent series for firms’ borrowing conditions, we find, within a structural vector autoregression framework, that, in response to an adverse financial shock, tangible investment falls more than intangible investment. This positive co-movement between tangible and intangible investment as well as the relative resilience of intangible investment pose a challenge for the theoretical model. We show that investment-specific adjustment costs help in reconciling the model with the observed empirical evidence. The estimation of the theoretical model using a Bayesian limited information approach yields support for the presence of much larger adjustment costs for intangible investment than for tangible investment.

We assess the effects of financial shocks on inflation, and to what extent financial shocks can account for the “missing disinflation” during the Great Recession. We apply a Bayesian vector autoregressive model to US data and identify financial shocks through a combination of narrative and short-run sign restrictions. Our main finding is that contractionary financial shocks temporarily increase inflation. This result withstands a large battery of robustness checks. Negative financial shocks help therefore to explain why inflation did not drop more sharply in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our analysis suggests that higher borrowing costs after negative financial shocks can account for the modest decrease in inflation after the financial crisis. A policy implication is that financial shocks act as supply-type shocks, moving output and inflation in opposite directions, thereby worsening the trade-off for a central bank with a dual mandate.

This paper investigates the effect of financial shocks using a general equilibrium model that links the firm's flows of financing with labor market variables. The results show that financial shocks have sizeable effects on debt, dividend payout, and wages. Shocks to the job destruction rate are important in explaining fluctuations in unemployment. The analysis also investigates the underlying driving forces of some key comovements in the data and finds shocks to the job destructions rate important.

In this paper, we study the positive and normative implications of financial shocks in a standard New Keynesian model that includes banks and frictions in the market for bank capital. We show how such frictions influence materially the effects of bank liquidity shocks and the properties of optimal policy. In particular, they limit the scope for countercyclical monetary policy in the face of these shocks. A fiscal policy instrument can complement monetary policy by offsetting the balance-sheet effects of these shocks, and jointly optimal policies attain the same equilibrium that monetary policy (alone) could attain in the absence of equity-market frictions.