The aim of this study is to bring to light and make clear the characteristic equivoque Pavlov made when he conceived the neurophysiological circuit involved in conditioned behavior as if this circuit contained or reduced, in its own terms, such behavior. I also wish to point out how this interpretation implies a distorted concept of the relationships between neurophysiology and behavior. As an alternative, it is proposed that behavior, which is always operant behavior, is not at all reducible to its neurophysiological ingredients, but instead acts like an arrow-head for adaptation that, in turn, confers a subordinate function to the neurophysiological ingredients involved. To make this evident, behavior is considered an operant organic activity that takes place in an environment of “remote co-present” texture, and different from its neurophysiological ingredients, which take place within the context of spatial contiguity relationships.

These short notes describe the way in which Skinner considers and resolves his differences with Pavlov in the question of the relation between psychology and physiology as forms of knowledge. After establishing his viewpoint in the general epistemological issue, Skinner is concerned about linking his study of behavior to the work of Pavlov, who considered it to be of a physiological nature. Skinner contrasts Pavlov's empirical and theoretical work and characterizes the latter in terms of the notion of the “Conceptual Nervous System.”

The scientific adventure of the Ivan Pavlov Department of Physiology is traced from Pavlov's and his students pioneer work on “psychic salivation” to the times of the Biological Station at Koltushi. The development of the Department after Pavlov's death is described and the research trends of the three present laboratories (Neurobiology of Integrative Brain Functions, Psychophysiology of Emotions, and Neurodynamic Correction of Psycho Neurological Pathology) are discussed.