Chapter 3 summarizes existing theories of election-related violence and introduces a theory of violence as a result of elite misperception. Existing theories rely upon the assumption that politicians choice of violence as an electoral tactic is based on an accurate assessment its relative costs and benefits. The theory of elite misperception, on the other hand, builds on two insights: (1) that voter backlash against violence is substantial and can cost politicians votes and (2) politicians frequently misjudge voter preferences – including with respect to violence – which can lead them to overestimate its benefits as an electoral tactic. The theory points to the difficulties politicians face in accurately assessing the impact of electoral tactics, as well as to the prevalence of cognitive biases that can cause them to misinterpret what information they have. It also highlights the importance of founding elections in determining which electoral tactics – violence included – are considered effective and worthy of emulation. With these insights in mind, the theory explains the incidence and persistence of election-related violence as a result of politicians misperceptions about voter preferences and the effects of violence on voting rather than the objective electoral benefits that violence provides.

This chapter summarizes the argument and findings presented in the book, explores a number of their implications, and discusses their relevance to broader debates. It argues that the books findings point to a need for research to more carefully evaluate the costs of violent electoral tactics in addition to its electoral benefits, including more micro-level research – such as that presented in the book – that explores voter responses to violence. In addition, scholars should ask more explicitly whether and how political elites are able to accurately assess the relative costs and benefits of violence and other electoral tactics. Future research should delve deeper into the question of how and why elite misperceive voter preferences, and when and why it is most likely to occur.

This chapter explores whether and how the findings from Kenya travel elsewhere around the world, analyzing cross-national quantitative analyses and case studies of a diverse group of countries with historically varying levels of violence, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, and Brazil. The analyses show how the causes and consequences of election-related violence identified in Kenya can help explain violence (or its absence) in other competitive electoral contexts as well. The cross-national quantitative analysis demonstrates the key role that the conduct of founding elections – in particular, the tactics used by the founding election winner – appears to play in whether or not violence becomes commonly employed by parties and candidates in the electoral cycles that follow. The case studies reveal little to no evidence that violence is effective in helping parties and candidates win office but do identify instances in which it may have resulted in voter backlash. In addition to identifying key structural conditions that make violence a more viable option in some cases than others, the analysis finds evidence consistent with the idea that the conduct of founding elections plays an important role in shaping politicians beliefs and expectations about the effects of violence on their electoral prospects.

The events in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 present a series of empirical puzzles unanswered in the comparative political scholarship: We see puzzling variation with respect to the particular processes of party formation, political mobilization, and opposition group survival or dissolution in the context of regime transitions. These puzzles are particularly evident in Egypt, where a repressed opposition group (the Muslim Brotherhood) won the 2011 founding elections only to be forced from office eighteen months later, while other opposition groups that were active in protesting the Egyptian regime did not even form a political party to run in the 2011 elections. Common explanations for events in Egypt focus on idiosyncratic features of the Egyptian political landscape and fail to explain similar events in other cases in Eastern Europe, Africa, and South America. An approach that takes into account the mechanisms linking the authoritarian past to the events surrounding founding elections offers not only an explanation for events in Egypt but also illuminates comparative cases of founding elections more generally. The book uses comparative process tracing to excavate the mechanisms at play in Egypt and then test them in five comparative cases, linking the authoritarian political ecosystem to the outcome of founding elections.