Working Nation is not the radical break with the existing policy framework implied by Albanese’s pre-election rhetoric. However, restoring a meaningful definition of full employment as an objective of government policy is a step in the right direction.

In the 1950s and 1960s unemployment averaged about 2 per cent. The lowest level of unemployment in the last twenty years was double that and long term unemployment, virtually unknown in the 1950s and 1960s, has been a severe problem. In each period there were two major slumps. We examine the progress of each slump and macroeconomic policy responses in each case, in order to search for reasons for this contrast. The priority given to minimising unemployment rather than restraining inflation is the most important difference between the two periods. Other major principles stand out, the most important of which are that in response to a downturn a fiscal policy stimulus is essential and must play the major part of any response; and that implementation must be swift and then followed up by further measures if necessary.

In 1945 the Curtin Labor Government declared it had the capacity and responsibility to permanently eliminate the blight of unemployment from the lives of Australians in its White Paper ‘Full Employment in Australia’. This was the culmination of a century of struggle to establish the ‘right to work’, once a key objective of the 19th century labour movement. Deeply resented and long resisted by employer groups, the policy was abandoned in the mid-1970s, without an electoral mandate. Although the Australian Labor Party and union movement urged public vigilance to preserve full employment during 23 years of Liberal rule, after 1978 they quietly dropped the policy as the Australian Labor Party turned increasingly to corporate donors for the money they needed to stay electorally competitive. While few leading lights of today’s Labor movement care to discuss it, it is right that Australians celebrate this bold statement of our right to work, and the 30 years of full employment it heralded.

The campaign to pass the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act has been misunderstood by many historians. Rather than a failed attempt to resuscitate New Deal Keynesianism by an exhausted Democratic Party, it represented a radical effort to reconfigure the political economy of the United States by embracing national planning ideas that were enjoying a revival in response to the economic crisis of the 1970s. The fact that this bill proved politically viable challenges historians’ assumptions that this decade saw the American people turn away from “big government” and toward pro-market solutions for social and economic problems. This episode also forces us to reassess our understanding of the Democratic Party in this decade. It suggests that historians have erred in drawing a sharp distinction between the party’s “New Deal” and “New Politics” factions and that the policy goals of those factions dovetailed more often than has been appreciated.