The integration of sustainability into highly uncertain technology development is key to support manufacturing companies to reduce their environmental impacts. The use of future scenarios to support decision-making in early design for sustainability is promising, but there is a lack of systematic guidelines on how to build them. Through literature review and empirical research scenario-building guidelines were designed. The guidelines are step-by-step activities to be performed in workshops. Results suggest the guidelines were successful in building consistent, plausible, and useful scenarios.

Scenario planning is often used in design practice to foster futures thinking, reduce uncertainties and improve decision-making. Scenarios are especially relevant for innovation activities in manufacturing companies, such as technology development, a particularly uncertain process where many trade-offs occur. This study is, to the authors knowledge, the first to empirically measure the effect of scenarios in decision-making quality, in the context of technology development. In a quasi-experiment, engineers from a manufacturing company and university students were independently asked to analyse a trade-off situation between environmental and financial aspects of a technology concept, with and without scenarios. The quality of decision-making quality for control and experiment groups was measured through a standardized questionnaire. The results show that scenarios had a positive impact in 6 of the 7 quality decision-making practices (QMDP), although the effect size is small. The results suggest that both expert and novice designers may benefit from using scenario planning when performing early-stage design activities by having awareness of the decision context, a more structured decision process, and clearer decision criteria.

Typicality arguments attempt to use the Copernican Principle to draw conclusions about the cosmos and presently unknown conscious beings within it, including extraterrestrial intelligences (ETI). The most notorious is the Doomsday Argument, which purports to constrain humanity's future from its current lifespan alone. These arguments rest on a likelihood calculation that penalizes models in proportion to the number of distinguishable observers. I argue that such reasoning leads to solipsism, the belief that one is the only being in the world, and is therefore unacceptable. Using variants of the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ thought experiment as a guide, I present a framework for evaluating observations in a large cosmos: Weighted Fine Graining (WFG). WFG requires the construction of specific models of physical outcomes and observations. Valid typicality arguments then emerge from the combinatorial properties of third-person physical microhypotheses. Indexical (observer-relative) facts do not directly constrain physical theories, but instead weight different provisional evaluations of credence. As indexical knowledge changes, the weights shift. I show that the self-applied Doomsday Argument fails in WFG, even though it can work for an external observer. I argue that the Copernican Principle does not let us apply self-observations to constrain ETIs.

We consider the Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (SETI) activities from a bioethical standpoint. In particular, we argue that there is a moral duty to search for other intelligent beings in the Universe. Some of them could – and are likely to be – morally enhanced in the sense that they are not only capable of unmistakable moral reasoning but are also capable of consistently acting upon the results of such deliberations. Even if the probability of finding such morally superior beings is small, it is higher than zero in any case; in fact, our astrobiological knowledge suggests that this probability is significant. Hence, there are both deductive and inductive arguments for the proposition that our duty is to search for such morally superior extraterrestrial beings. In other words, there is a duty to undertake and support our SETI efforts. The argument to that effect runs parallel to some of the arguments deployed in current debates on human moral enhancement.

Will we, by 2050, be able to feed a rapidly growing population with healthy and sustainably grown food in a world threatened by systemic environmental crises? There are too many uncertainties for us to predict the long-term evolution of the global agri-food system, but we can explore a wide range of futures to inform policymaking and public debate on the future of food. This is typically done by creating scenarios (story lines that vividly describe what different futures could look like) and quantifying them with computer simulation models to get numerical estimates of how different aspects of the global agri-food system might evolve under different hypotheses. Among the many scenarios produced over the last twenty years, one would expect to see the future advocated by the food sovereignty movement, which claims to represent roughly two hundred million self-described “peasants” (small farmers) worldwide. This movement defends a vision of the future based on relocalized, sustainable, and just agri-food systems, self-governed through direct and participatory democratic processes. Yet, food sovereignty is conspicuously absent from quantified scenarios of global food futures. As part of the roundtable, “Ethics and the Future of the Global Food System,” this essay identifies seven obstacles that undermine the creation of food sovereignty scenarios by examining two attempts at crafting such scenarios.

How special (or not) is the epoch we are living in? What is the appropriate reference class for embedding the observations made at the present time? How probable – or else – is anything we observe in the fulness of time? Contemporary cosmology and astrobiology bring those seemingly old-fashioned philosophical issues back into focus. There are several examples of contemporary research which use the assumption of typicality in time (or temporal Copernicanism) explicitly or implicitly, while not truly elaborating upon the meaning of this assumption. The present paper brings attention to the underlying and often uncritically accepted assumptions in these cases. It also aims to defend a more radical position that typicality in time is not – and cannot ever be – well-defined, in contrast to the typicality in space, and the typicality in various specific parameter spaces. This, of course, does not mean that we are atypical in time; instead, the notion of typicality in time is necessarily somewhat vague and restricted. In principle, it could be strengthened by further defining the relevant context, e.g. by referring to typicality within the Solar lifetime, or some similar restricting clause.