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1 results

  • 4 - Primary Voters as the Source of Punishment

  • Sarah E. Anderson, University of California, Santa Barbara, Daniel M. Butler, University of California, San Diego, Laurel Harbridge-Yong, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book:
    Rejecting Compromise
    Published online:
    28 January 2020
    Print publication:
    20 February 2020, pp 55-81

  • Summary

    Chapter 4 explores which voters – general election voters, primary voters, or campaign donors – legislators fear will punish them for compromise. In-person surveys of state legislators confirm that legislators mostly fear punishment from primary voters. Legislators believe that primary voters would prefer that legislators vote to kill compromise bills, worry that these primary voters would punish them if they supported such legislation, and act in response to this concern. Beyond the patterns in surveys of state legislators, congressional roll call votes from 2011 to 2015 show that greater Tea Party support in a district predicted an increased likelihood that Republican House members voted against compromise bills. Together, these results highlight how legislators’ concerns about how primary voters respond to compromise can dissuade legislators from compromising.