Political research has argued that systematic inequalities in political participation are bound to produce a system that caters more to those who actively voice their opinions. Yet it might be that citizens who rarely see their preferences translated to policy are discouraged from participating in politics. In this chapter, we attempt to estimate the extent to which unequal representation affects participation. Using nine survey measures of system satisfaction across twenty-nine European countries, and looking at nine forms of political participation, we decompose gaps in participation and estimate counterfactually how large these gaps would have been if low-educated and poor citizens had the same beliefs about the system as more-educated and affluent citizens. We find that the gap in voting between the bottom and top education/income quintile would be around 15 20 percent smaller if those groups were equally optimistic about the workings of the system. These results suggest that unequal participation is partly attributable to the system being unequally responsive.

This paper pools datasets on policy responsiveness to public opinion in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Following the empirical strategy set out by Gilens (2012), we show that the policy outputs correspond much better to the preferences of affluent citizens than to the preferences of low- and middle-income citizens in all four countries. We proceed to explore how government partisanship conditions unequal responsiveness. In so doing, we distinguish between economic/welfare issues and other issues and we also distinguish between the period before 1998 and the period since 1998. Our findings suggest that policymaking under Left-leaning governments was relatively more responsive to low- and middle-income citizens in the economic/welfare domain before 1998, but this was not true for other policy domains before 1998 and it is no longer true for the economic/welfare domain. We conclude with some general reflections on the implications of our empirical findings for the literature on mechanisms of unequal representation in liberal democracies.

A new literature on advanced democracies questions the capacity of majorities to influence fiscal policies to advance their distributive interests, either because the modern state is undercut by increasingly footloose capital, or because the wealthy subvert the majority will through the power of money. This paper critically assesses the evidence using an amended dataset from the Luxembourg Income Study and new data from the World Inequality Database (WID). We use a three-class setup and axiomatically derive the distributive interests of each class and then assess these predictions against data on transfers, public services, and insurance for eighteen OECD countries since the 1970s. For the middle class, the transfer ratio (transfers and services as a percent of the net income of the rich) is remarkably stable, and with the notable exception of the United States, so is the relative position of the middle class in the overall income distribution. Top-end inequality and measures of globalization play no role, but both the poor and the middle class do better under center-left governments.

This chapter turns to the comparison of cases. By analyzing the discontented cases, a clear pattern emerges. The positive cases share few characteristics save one: democratic discontent that arose when sharp economic contractions intensified the imperfections and contradictions of the political status quo. This argument is made using paired comparisons of the positive and negative cases (Canada with the USA/UK, Portugal with Spain, Uruguay with Brazil/Chile) to evaluate competing explanations. The second section of the chapter analyzes how discontent was avoided during the Great Recession by looking for shared features of the three negative cases. It finds that escaping the initial pain of a crisis was not a necessary condition for avoiding discontent. Instead, the key to maintaining democratic legitimacy lay in the political response to the crises, and in the adaptability and health of left-wing parties. In all three negative cases, center-left parties recognized crises as indictments of neoliberalism, rejected its calls for austerity. By responding to popular demands for help in difficult times, these parties deprived cultural conflicts of the oxygen needed for them to rage and avoided major upsurges of discontent.