This chapter discusses distinctive features of Darwin’s theory of evolution, noting when they coincide with contemporary biology and when they depart. Darwin held ● that all life on earth today traces back to a common ancestor ● that natural selection is the main but not the exclusive cause of evolution ● that evolution is opportunistic, not pre-programmed ● that natural selection often causes traits to evolve because they help the organisms that have them to survive and reproduce, but sometimes selection causes traits to evolve because they help groups to avoid extinction and to found new daughter groups ● that evolution by natural selection is a gradual process ● that novel traits (now called mutations) have their causes, but they do not happen because they would be good for the organisms in which they occur ● that the distinction between species and sub-specific varieties is a matter of convention ● that middling phenotypes are usually fitter than phenotypes that are more extreme ● that traits acquired in the life-time of parents can be passed along as inherited characteristics to offspring.

● Darwin believed that mutations have their causes, but they do not arise because they would be good for the organisms in which they occur; they are “random,” not “guided.” ● Darwin also held that adaptive evolution is a gradual process, meaning that it involves the accumulation of small phenotypic changes rather than large ones. ● An experiment by the Lederbergs is analyzed that is widely taken to refute the idea that mutations are guided. ● A thought experiment is provided to clarify what the theses of random and guided mutation mean. ● It is argued that the fact that microbial populations increase their mutation rates when they are starved does not show that mutations are guided. ● R.A. Fisher’s geometric argument for gradualism is analyzed. Motoo Kimura’s formula for the fixation probability of an allele shows why Fisher’s argument fails; Allen Orr’s follow-up does better. ● Fisher and Orr are talking about the likelihood of gradualism, not its probability.

This chapter draws conclusions based on the impacts of exclusionary and hierarchical practices, the relative value of ‘top-down’ reform and ‘bottom-up’ activism, and the place of global learning in a gradualist approach to progressive change. Beyond that, the chapter considers how an approach inspired by American Pragmatism informs Global International Relations, which seeks to construct a discipline that is more inclusive of non-Western perspectives. The chapter draws parallels between the book’s reading of classical Pragmatism and non-Western ‘cosmologies’ like Confucianism. This has been introduced to contemporary Western IR mainly through the works of Yaqing Qin. The chapter does, however, build on other works identifying resonances across Deweyan Pragmatism and Confucian philosophy. The chapter argues that if the Pragmatist turn in Western IR continues, then it can be more easily harmonized with non-Western approaches. This at least signposts a path ‘towards’ Global IR, even if it does not fix the path’s end point. Indeed, the chapter argues that we should follow such signs because they do not fix the destination. Those points are for practitioners and global publics to construct and reconstruct as they work collectively to mitigate lived problems through communities of practice that are inclusive, reflexive, creative and deliberative.

This book explores the idea that there is a gray area in ethics. My central claim is that some acts are somewhat right and somewhat wrong, meaning that deontic concepts such as RIGHT and WRONG (capitalized to indicate that we are discussing the concepts and not the entities they refer to) are gradable. Philosophical theories of indeterminacy and vagueness can shed light on some aspects of the gradualist hypothesis, but they leave important questions open. It is, for instance, not clear what a morally conscientious agent should do if she must choose among options that are somewhat right and somewhat wrong.

If every act is either right or wrong simpliciter, a morally conscientious agent is rationally permitted to perform any of the right acts but none of the wrong ones. But what should a morally conscientious agent do when faced with a choice between options that are somewhat right and somewhat wrong? Five possible decision criteria are discussed. According to the maximizing criterion, it is rationally permissible to perform act a if and only if no option is right to a greater degree. The liberal criterion holds that it is rationally permissible to perform every act that is not entirely wrong, and the threshold criterion asserts that is rationally permissible to perform an act just in case it is not more wrong than right. The gappy criterion holds that if an act is neither right nor wrong simpliciter, then there is no fact of the matter about whether it is rationally permissible to perform. Finally, the probabilistic criterion maintains that if an act is neither entirely right nor entirely wrong, then the act is rationally permissible to perform if and only if it is chosen randomly with a probability that reflects its degree of rightness.

This chapter sets up theoretical framework for the entire book. The effectiveness of China’s own development and its engagements in Africa cannot be plausibly explained by the existing theories on the China Model. Researchers’ efforts to define tenets and patterns of “Beijing Consensus” all fail to grasp the dynamic complexity in practice. By analyzing the implication of Chinese pragmatism in the market reform, this chapter points out that the essence of modern development, in the form of industrial capitalism, lies in shifting from traditional cultural and religious values to the pursuit of sustainable productivity growth. The change of societal targets requires comprehensive sociopolitical transformation to enable sophisticated division of labor and massive market distribution. However, the simultaneous changes of numerous factors in a society tend to create a chicken-egg dilemma, hindering smooth structural transformation. China was able to escape this trap by having the whole country experiment flexibly and gradually to achieve synergism of development. The coevolutionary pragmatism has also been adopted in China’s cooperation with Africa. Aiming at achieving overall economic growth for partners, Chinese government and enterprises do not stick to definite models, but have open attitude to promote commercial practices in Africa’s diverse conditions.

So-called 'living fossils' provide a clue to the past. Five prominent mass extinctions are recognised often with changes in the rate or timing of developmental events.