Whereas emerging market firms (EMFs) face severe legitimacy barriers when entering global markets, whether and under what conditions green innovation can help them gain legitimacy remains under-examined. This article argues that green innovation can help EMFs obtain regulatory and social legitimacy in host countries and consequently boost their exports. Based on a panel dataset populated by 254 Chinese-listed manufacturing companies from 2011 through 2017, this article finds that green innovation is positively associated with EMF export performance. Moreover, this positive relationship is stronger when host-country political risk is lower or host-country buyer sophistication is higher but becomes weaker for state-owned EMFs. These findings enrich the legitimacy-based view and international business literature by identifying the role of green innovation in boosting EMF export performance and specifying important institutional contingencies.

From 2013 to 2015, China gradually established nationwide air quality monitoring stations and began to release real-time air pollution information to the public. We exploit step-by-step environmental regulations across cities to identify the effects of information disclosure on air pollution. We find that information disclosure significantly decreases the concentrations of PM2.5 and PM10. Through mechanism analysis, we find that information disclosure raises the level of government awareness, increases the amount of investments in air pollution prevention and control, stimulates green innovation, and forces heavily polluting enterprises to shut down. Additionally, we find evidence that the effectiveness of information disclosure varies across cities.

Recently, in their 2019 paper, Poyago-Theotoky and Yong consider a managerial Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities and emission taxes and propose an explicit environmental incentive in a managerial compensation contract. The authors compare several exogenous equilibria emerging in the symmetric sub-games in which the owner offers either the environmental delegation contract or the standard sales delegation contract: abatement and social welfare (resp. emission taxes) under environmental delegation are higher (resp. lower) than under sales delegation. The present work extends their model using a game-theoretic approach to analyse the asymmetric sub-games, in which only one firm adopts the environmental contract, and adds the contract decision stage. Results show that the environmental contract never emerges as the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative managerial decision game. Indeed, if the green R&D technology is efficient, the sales contract emerges as the unique Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, if the green R&D technology is inefficient, multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist (coordination game). Our findings offer direct policy implications.

Innovation is an important part of energy policy, and encouraging clean energy innovation is often an explicit goal of policy makers. For local governments, promoting clean energy innovation is seen not only as a pathway to a cleaner economy but also as a tool for promoting the local economy. But is such optimism warranted? There is a substantial literature examining the relationships between innovation and environmental policy, but few studies focus explicitly on innovation at the state and local level. In this paper, I provide key lessons from research on clean energy innovation, focusing on lessons relevant for state and local governments. I then summarize the results of a recent working paper by Fu et al. (2018) that studied wind energy innovation across individual states in the United States. While state-level policies can promote clean energy innovation, it is overall market size that matters most. Thus, innovation need not occur in those states most actively promoting clean energy. I conclude with lessons for state and local governments drawn from both this work and the broader literature on energy innovation.

One striking finding from recent natural environmental management research is that family firms are more likely to engage in environmentally friendly practices. However, the source of such difference is less clear. The primary objective of our research is to investigate if family firms react to stakeholder pressures differently when making natural environmental management decisions. We survey 235 manufacturing firms from the chemical, and the electronic and information technology industries in Taiwan to test our hypotheses. The results of regression analysis show that family firms pay much more attention to their internal stakeholders than non-family firms. This finding complements the current discussions on family business uniqueness. It also contributes to provide a more comprehensive framework of stakeholder salience.