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This chapter discusses the normative and doctrinal implications of the theory. At the broadest level, the book is skeptical of political control of administrative actions when it comes to particularities. This viewpoint argues against the nondelegation doctrine, popular on the right, and also against models of the state that emphasize presidential control over administrative bodies, widely popular in recent decades. Lodging control over particularities of policy in the hands of democratic organs offers only the illusion of a democratically responsive state, more often delivering various forms of capture. The preferred approach is instead for democratic organs to formulate policy at higher levels, which the public plausibly understands and provides fewer inroads for corruption, and then to have the reasoning state resolve the particularities. The chapter identifies ways in which the reasoning capacity of the state might be improved, for instance through more robust publication requirements and greater use of cost-benefit analysis.
This chapter is diagnostic in nature and marks a turn toward a normative assessment. It argues that we continue to experience high levels of distrust in government for three reasons. First, it observes that, however dark our current circumstances, the counterfactual in which the legislature is more active in lawmaking is darker still. Second, it points out that the scope of government activity has changed markedly over the last century, with the government edging into policy areas that may be comparatively difficult to build trust in. Third, and most relevant to the book’s thesis, the present state deviates from the theory in a variety of ways. For instance, administrative agencies increasingly favor thinly proceduralized actions, often at the expense of transparency, deliberation and public reasoning. Likewise, an ideology of presidential control over the administrative state threatens the space necessary for the reasoning state to thrive. Privatization of public roles, similarly, jeopardizes the place of the reasoning state.
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