This chapter investigates which factors affect the timing of guilty pleas for defendants under the current regime of a quantified sliding scale of sentence discounts. Certain vulnerable defendants are found to be more likely to plead guilty such as young adult defendants. It is discovered that the stages of the criminal process preceding plea taking have been found to significantly affect plea outcomes. Defendants who have confessed to the police and who are represented by publicly funded lawyers are more likely to plead guilty, and to plead guilty earlier. Furthermore, the extant literature also points to defendants remanded in custody to be susceptible to pleading guilty earlier as well. Under a guilty plea process that features a sliding scale of sentence discounts, different factors may serve as potential pressures for defendants to plead guilty, and to plead guilty as early as possible.

This chapter discusses the adoption, and rejection, of a quantified sliding scale of sentence in comparable legal jurisdictions. The chapter begins with England and Wales, where the sliding scale of sentence discounts was first standardised. It then looks at Hong Kong, where its sliding scale of sentence discounts was a judicial creation of the appellate court that took inspiration from the developments in England and Wales. Afterwards, this chapter examines certain Australian states that have moved towards a quantified sliding scale of sentence discounts. It then discusses the two jurisdictions of Scotland and New Zealand, which have rejected the quantified sliding scale of sentence discounts in favour of greater judicial discretion. It is shown that despite the varying responses to whether quantified guidelines for sentence discounts for guilty pleas should be implemented, all the jurisdictions surveyed agree that earlier guilty pleas should generally attract higher sentence discounts, primarily justified based on the perceived utilitarian benefits of early guilty pleas.

This chapter introduces readers to the history of the problem of ‘cracked trials’, that are trials that do not proceed on the scheduled day, yet does not need rescheduling, as the case has already reached an outcome. The predominant reason for this is the defendant entering a late guilty plea. According to official discourse, cracked trials are attributed to tactical defendants who ‘play the system’ by delaying their guilty pleas. This chapter also introduces readers to the sentence discount as a response to encouraging defendants to plead guilty, and to plead guilty as early as possible. Under the sliding scale of sentence discounts, the early you plead guilty, the greater the sentence discount you receive. The rest of the chapter outlines the rest of the book.

This concluding chapter summarises the key findings of the book. It argues that efficiency should not be limited to case disposition but should be looked at more holistically. Procedural justice theory offers valuable insights into how this may be achieved. Moreover, instead of solely focusing on reaching a guilty plea as early as possible, the criminal process should be recalibrated to ensure that the plea decision is indeed an informed and voluntary choice by the defendant. This chapter concludes by discussing areas of future research.