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This chapter examines the legacy of Kuhn’s Structure for normative philosophy of science. It begins with an examination of Kuhn’s normative methodology and his position that historical cases provide evidence for philosophical claims. Kuhn’s philosophical methodology is insufficiently articulated, and his utilization of case studies is subject to objections implied by Pitt’s dilemma of case studies. The chapter subsequently examines the post-Kuhnian methodological positions of Ian Hacking, Helen Longino, Michael Friedman, and Hasok Chang. These views suggest alternative methodological strategies in the history and philosophy of science (HPS) tradition for addressing normative issues. It concludes by articulating some outstanding methodological challenges for the pluralist tradition of HPS ? associated with the Stanford and Minnesota schools of philosophy of science ? that emerged in the 1980s and remains influential.
This Element offers a new account of the philosophical significance of logical empiricism that relies on the past forty years of literature reassessing the project. It argues that while logical empiricism was committed to empiricism and did become tied to the trajectory of analytic philosophy, neither empiricism nor logical analysis per se was the deepest philosophical commitment of logical empiricism. That commitment was, rather, securing the scientific status of philosophy, bringing philosophy into a scientific conception of the world.
Two questions should be considered when assessing the Kantian dimensions of Kuhn’s thought. Was Kuhn a Kantian? Did Kuhn have an influence on later Kantians and neo-Kantians? Kuhn mentioned Kant as an inspiration, and his focus on explanatory frameworks and the conditions of knowledge appear Kantian. But Kuhn’s emphasis on learning; on activities of symbolization; on paradigms as practical, not just theoretical; and on the social and community aspects of scientific research as constitutive of scientific reasoning are outside the Kantian perspective. Kuhn’s admiration for Kant is tempered by his desire to understand the processes of learning, initiation into a scientific community, experimentation using instruments, and persuasion, drawing on the work of Piaget, Koyré, Wittgenstein, and others. Both Kuhn and Kant were interested in the status of science, and the role of the scientist in its development and justification. But Kuhn presents science in a much more messy, historically contingent, and socially charged way than Kant does. The paper’s conclusion evaluates Kuhn’s reception among researchers including Richardson and Friedman, assessing the prospects for future work.
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