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5 results

  • Chapter 13 - Glutty theories and the logic of antinomies

  • from Part III - Specific Issues
  • Edited by Penelope Rush, University of Tasmania
  • Book:
    The Metaphysics of Logic
    Published online:
    05 October 2014
    Print publication:
    16 October 2014, pp 224-232

  • Summary

    A transcendental philosophy as described and practiced by Kant is itself a logic. It is not intended to decide such factual questions as whether there is a God or humans are free, but to address semantical issues like what the meaning of God or freedom is. Within the semantical space where the (transcendental) logical enterprise is located, one can take different words as primitives and establish a network of semantical relations and dependencies based on those primitives. A logic is a self-organizing structure, self-enclosed and self-referential, that provides the bare scaffolding of a world and, if given enough data, even a large part of its actual construction. Logic is a highly ambitious theory: one that attempts to construct a universal language. In and by itself, this theory will be found persuasive only by those who are already committed to the particular view it expresses and articulates.

  • Bibliography

  • Edited by Lara Ostaric, Temple University, Philadelphia
  • Book:
    Interpreting Schelling
    Published online:
    05 October 2014
    Print publication:
    29 September 2014, pp 238-250

  • Summary

    At the most general level of description, formal freedom as spontaneous self-determination on the basis of concepts of ends, the account that Schelling attributes to idealism is in fact common to Immanuel Kant and Fichte. Kant and Fichte shared a conception of substantive freedom as the autonomy of the rational will. The distinction between Kant's account and Fichte's is that the former understood substantive self-determination in terms of a law that rational agency gives itself, whereas the latter understood it in terms of an end that rational agency sets for itself. The idea that the exercise of human freedom is actually responsible for the introduction of chaos into the order of things, prefigured in Philosophy and Religion, is a staple of Schelling's late philosophy. But this view becomes dominant only with the Ages of the World drafts, and coexists in the Freiheitsschrift alongside remnants of Schelling's earlier view.

  • Chapter 9 - Pluralism in the ethical community

  • Edited by Gordon Michalson
  • Book:
    Kant’s <I>Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason</I>
    Published online:
    05 May 2014
    Print publication:
    17 April 2014, pp 175-192

  • Summary

    One of Immanuel Kant's most deeply held convictions was that human beings are by nature capable of being free, able to determine what they ought to be as human beings: responsible persons among persons. Kant develops the dilemma in his account of radical evil. For every moment of her life, a person ascertains that she wills evil without being able to explain this through appeal to a free decision in the past between the will for good or for evil. For each human being possesses three original predispositions that belong to the very possibility of such a being, namely the predispositions to animality, humanity, and personality. Kant's discussion of evil arises from his conception of freedom. The reality of freedom justifies the author's rational hope in the existence of God who makes it possible for persons to overcome their being evil by nature and orient themselves toward the good.

  • Chapter 8 - Kant’s Jesus

  • Edited by Gordon Michalson
  • Book:
    Kant’s <I>Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason</I>
    Published online:
    05 May 2014
    Print publication:
    17 April 2014, pp 156-174

  • Summary

    Immanuel Kant's concept of evil is extremely abstract and general, but also in a way extremely simple. We can better understand its distinctiveness if we contrast it with two fairly commonways, both rejected by Kant, in which evil is sometimes conceived so as to make it seem more intelligible than Kant believes it can be. Kant's rigoristic position on human character in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is fairly narrow in scope. In human nature, Kant identifies three original or basic predispositions: animality, humanity, and personality. The predisposition to humanity includes the development of the passions, that is, inclinations which take the form of "mania" because they resist comparison with and limitation by other desires, and consequently resist the influence of reason. Kant views human sociability in the context of human freedom, simply because it provides the historical context in which human reason and freedom have developed.

  • 4 - Heidegger's concept of freedom, 1927–1930

  • Edited by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Boston University
  • Book:
    Interpreting Heidegger
    Published online:
    11 April 2011
    Print publication:
    17 March 2011, pp 79-105

  • Summary

    The concept of freedom plays an important role in Being and Time and takes on an increasingly important place in Heidegger's essays and lectures of the post- Being and Time. Heidegger's distinctive and unusual conception of human freedom is to contrast it with the dominant conception of "free will" or "free choice" in mainstream philosophy. According to Heidegger's reading of De Anima, Aristotle defines a human being as a moving being who can make connections through logos. Towards the end of Being and Time, Heidegger begins to use the word "finite" that presages the emphasis on finitude in his 1929 Kant book, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. On Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, the conclusion to draw is that the essence of a person is the "self-responsibility to bind oneself to oneself, to be in the mode of self-responsibility, to answer only to the essence of one's self".