This chapter highlights two distinct perspectives – international and domestic – on the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention). The international perspective is framed by reference to article 4 of the Convention and the maximalist approach taken by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The domestic perspective is conceptualised by reference to the direct and indirect application of the Convention as permitted by the reception rules in monist, dualist, and hybrid legal systems. The chapter argues that the international and domestic perspectives on the judicial application of the Convention differ on account of the different institutional positions of the bodies that control them (the Committee vs the domestic courts). The maximalist international position promoted by the Committee is often unavailable to the domestic courts, although it may be a potential inspiration to them. Canvassing these distinct perspectives provides the context for a better understanding of the limitations in the domestic courts’ engagement with the Convention, detailed in the subsequent chapters.

This chapter analyses the indirect judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention) in Australia, which is a federal state of dualist tradition. The chapter demonstrates the vulnerability of the Convention in a system of parliamentary supremacy where the Convention is not legislatively incorporated and where the Parliament can make laws contrary to it. In this context, the traditional methods of engaging with the Convention have yielded limited results where there was tension with the domestic law, but were more impactful when there was convergence between the two sets of norms, as seen in the family law context. The Convention is also weakened by the absence of a federal human rights statute. The case study of the application of the Convention by the Supreme Court of Victoria shows that human rights statutes that contain child-specific provisions facilitate the judicial application of the Convention. The chapter also illustrates the creativity of the courts, which occasionally engaged with the Convention in sui generis ways, not explicitly acknowledged as formal methods of engagement.

Drawing from the case studies on the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention) in France, Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, this chapter argues that albeit fundamentally different in form, the direct and the indirect application of the Convention, respectively, produce similar effects. Both permit a meaningful engagement with the Convention and the development of child-sensitive reasoning. The chapter highlights that alongside the traditional methods of engagement with the Convention, courts have applied it in a sui generis manner. This demonstrates that the traditional reception rules are unable to capture the diversity of courts’ interaction with the Convention. The chapter discusses the factors that influence the courts’ application of the Convention and highlights the importance of the domestic structure of reception for the judicial application of the Convention. The chapter also concludes that article 3(1) of the Convention has been a favourite of the courts, who see it as a rich repository of legal principles and standards that allow them to justify a distinct legal treatment for children.

This chapter analyses the indirect judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention) in the United Kingdom, a dualist legal system where the Convention has not been fully incorporated through legislation. Although the courts have somewhat engaged with the Convention through the traditional methods (statutory interpretation and the development of the common law), the Convention has been given effect overwhelmingly in the context of the Human Rights Act 1998 (the HRA), and implicitly of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1951 (the ECHR). The joint application of the Convention with the HRA–ECHR tandem has been both a facilitating and an inhibiting factor in the judicial effect of the former. Like courts in other jurisdictions, UK courts have also applied the Convention in sui generis ways, diversifying thus the opportunities for its usage. The overlap between the Convention and other legal standards makes the assessment of its impact difficult, but it is clear that the application of the Convention is associated with a more child-sensitive judicial reasoning.

This chapter examines the ‘indirect application model’ in constitutional law whereby fundamental rights do not apply ‘directly’ to the relations between individuals but nevertheless influence the content of the private law legal rules that apply between non-state actors. The legal rules though articulate the obligations of non-state actors and, if fundamental rights affect those rules, they affect the obligations of non-state actors. I argue that the indirect application model has several drawbacks – including weakening rights and undermining their relational dimension - but ultimately collapses into a form of direct application model. I thus examine, through this lens, seminal cases in Germany and South Africa, seeking to understand what approach courts utilize to construct the substantive content of the obligations of non-state actors. The analysis highlights that courts draw on a number of factors together with an amorphous balancing process to determine those obligations – similar to the other models analysed in the book.