The assumption that people possess a repertoire of strategies to solve the inference problems they face has been made repeatedly. The experimental findings of two previous studies on strategy selection are reexamined from a learning perspective, which argues that people learn to select strategies for making probabilistic inferences. This learning process is modeled with the strategy selection learning (SSL) theory, which assumes that people develop subjective expectancies for the strategies they have. They select strategies proportional to their expectancies, which are updated on the basis of experience. For the study by Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003) it can be shown that people did not anticipate the success of a strategy from the beginning of the experiment. Instead, the behavior observed at the end of the experiment was the result of a learning process that can be described by the SSL theory. For the second study, by Bröder and Schiffer (2006), the SSL theory is able to provide an explanation for why participants only slowly adapted to new environments in a dynamic inference situation. The reanalysis of the previous studies illustrates the importance of learning for probabilistic inferences.

This article presents a theory of reasoning about moral propositions that is based on four fundamental principles. First, no simple criterion picks out propositions about morality from within the larger set of deontic propositions concerning what is permissible and impermissible in social relations, the law, games, and manners. Second, the mechanisms underlying emotions and deontic evaluations are independent and operate in parallel, and so some scenarios elicit emotions prior to moral evaluations, some elicit moral evaluations prior to emotions, and some elicit them at the same time. Third, deontic evaluations depend on inferences, either unconscious intuitions or conscious reasoning. Fourth, human beliefs about what is, and isn’t, moral are neither complete nor consistent. The article marshals the evidence, which includes new studies, corroborating these principles, and discusses the relations between them and other current theories of moral reasoning.

Mentalizing, a dynamic form of social cognition, is strengthened by language experience. Past research has found that bilingual children and adults outperform monolinguals on mentalizing tasks. However, bilingual experiences are multidimensional and diverse, and it is unclear how continuous individual differences in bilingual language experience relate to mentalizing. Here, we examine whether individual differences in bilingual language diversity, measured through language entropy, continuously pattern with mentalizing judgments among bilingual adults, and whether this relationship is constrained by first vs. second language reading. We tested sixty-one bilingual adults on a reading and inference task that compared mental state and logical inferences. We found that greater language diversity patterned with higher mentalizing judgments of mental state inferences across all readers, and that L2 readers attributed more mentalizing to logical inferences compared to L1 readers. Together, we found evidence of a positive relationship between continuous individual differences in bilingual language diversity and mentalizing.

The paper explores the use of statistical data and statistical assumptions as evidence in criminal trials. It is suggested that a finding of guilt includes not only its main factual proposition but also additional propositions that support and affirm it. Specifically, it includes not only the proposition that the defendant committed the offence but also the additional affirming proposition that it is this defendant rather than any other potential defendant who committed the offence (the ‘D rather than A’ proposition). Some statistical generalisations provide reasons in defence of the main proposition but not in defence of the affirming proposition, which then remains random or arbitrary. Yet since criminal convictions include a moral judgement, they cannot be justified where some of their propositions are arbitrary. Accordingly, such statistical generalisations cannot justify a criminal conviction.

Recent agricultural economics literature has largely analyzed consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for many credence attributes, including place of origin, organic, locally grown, environment-friendly, fair trade, and animal welfare. In this study, we instead attempt to analyze why consumers value “locally grown,” which is a credence attribute receiving increasing attention in the market. Specifically, we propose a distinction between the direct effect and the indirect effect of “locally grown” on consumers’ attitudes towards agri-food products to explain consumers’ preferences for locally grown products. We collect data from an experiment with university students and analyze the data with a structural equation modeling methodology.

The knowledge base (KB) paradigm aims to express domain knowledge in a rich formal language, and to use this domain knowledge as a KB to solve various problems and tasks that arise in the domain by applying multiple forms of inference. As such, the paradigm applies a strict separation of concerns between information and problem solving. In this paper, we analyze the principles and feasibility of the KB paradigm in the context of an important class of applications: interactive configuration problems. In interactive configuration problems, a configuration of interrelated objects under constraints is searched, where the system assists the user in reaching an intended configuration. It is widely recognized in industry that good software solutions for these problems are very difficult to develop. We investigate such problems from the perspective of the KB paradigm. We show that multiple functionalities in this domain can be achieved by applying different forms of logical inferences on a formal specification of the configuration domain. We report on a proof of concept of this approach in a real-life application with a banking company.

Dynamic systems play a central role in fields such as planning, verification, and databases. Fragmented throughout these fields, we find a multitude of languages to formally specify dynamic systems and a multitude of systems to reason on such specifications. Often, such systems are bound to one specific language and one specific inference task. It is troublesome that performing several inference tasks on the same knowledge requires translations of your specification to other languages. In this paper we study whether it is possible to perform a broad set of well-studied inference tasks on one specification. More concretely, we extend IDP3 with several inferences from fields concerned with dynamic specifications.

A think-aloud protocol was used to examine the strategies used by individuals with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) during text comprehension. Twenty-three participants with MCI and 23 cognitively healthy older adults (OA) read narratives, pausing to verbalize their thoughts after each sentence. The verbal protocol analysis developed by Trabasso and Magliano (1996) was then used to code participants’ utterances into inferential and non-inferential statements; inferential statements were further coded to identify the memory operation used in their generation. Compared with OA controls, the MCI participants showed poorer story comprehension and produced fewer inferences. The MCI participants were also less skilled at providing explanations of story events and in using prior text information to support inference generation. Poorer text comprehension was associated with poorer verbal memory abilities and poorer use of prior text events when producing inferential statements. The results suggest that the memory difficulties of the MCI group may be an important cognitive factor interfering with their ability to integrate narrative events through the use of inferences and to form a global coherence to support text comprehension. (JINS, 2010, 16, 661–671.)

There has been a recent shift in the literature on mosquito/Plasmodium interactions with an increasingly large number of theoretical and experimental studies focusing on their population biology and evolutionary processes. Ecological immunology of mosquito-malaria interactions – the study of the mechanisms and function of mosquito immune responses to Plasmodium in their ecological and evolutionary context – is particularly important for our understanding of malaria transmission and how to control it. Indeed, describing the processes that create and maintain variation in mosquito immune responses and parasite virulence in natural populations may be as important to this endeavor as describing the immune responses themselves. For historical reasons, Ecological Immunology still largely relies on studies based on non-natural model systems. There are many reasons why current research should favour studies conducted closer to the field and more realistic experimental systems whenever possible. As a result, a number of researchers have raised concerns over the use of artificial host-parasite associations to generate inferences about population-level processes. Here I discuss and review several lines of evidence that, I believe, best illustrate and summarize the limitations of inferences generated using non-natural model systems.

This article is intended to be a report of the oral proceedings in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), detailing what took place in the Peace Palace and considering the arguments of the parties relating to the procedure adopted in the proceedings. These include the preliminary question of whether or not the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in the case, a question which has been reopened by Serbia and Montenegro following the 2004 judgment in the Legality of the Use of Force cases; the question of the impact of the workings of the ICTY on the current proceedings; the issue of new documents which has arisen, given the very long gap between the written and oral proceedings; the burden and standard of proof adopted by the Court and what inferences it may draw; and the methodology for hearing witness testimony in the Court. Each of the parties addressed the Court on these procedural issues in some detail, in addition to their pleadings on the substance of the merits of the case.

Previous research with an on-line processing task found that individuals without social anxiety generate benign inferences when ambiguous social information is encountered, but people with high social anxiety or social phobia do not (Hirsch and Mathews, 1997, 2000). In the present study, we tested if it is possible to induce a benign (or less negative) inferential bias in people who report anxiety about interviews by requiring them to take the perspective of an interview confident person, rather than their own. High interview anxious volunteers were allocated to read descriptions of job interviews, either taking their own perspective in the described situation or that of a confident interviewee. At certain points during the text, a target letter string appeared and participants were asked to indicate whether it formed a word or a non-word (lexical decision). Some of the lexical decisions occurred in the context of ambiguous text that could be interpreted in both a threatening and a benign manner. In a baseline condition, decisions were made following text for which there was only one possible inference (either threat or benign). The results indicated that, compared to the self referent condition, participants who adopted the perspective of a confident other person showed enhanced inhibition of threat inferences.

Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) hypothesizes that the functionality of inferences is primarily affected by the preferential and demanding nature of rational and irrational beliefs, respectively. It is then, secondarily, influenced by the functional and dysfunctional contents to which rational and irrational beliefs, respectively, refer. This hypothesis was tested by asking 96 participants to imagine themselves holding one of four specific beliefs: a rational belief with a preference and a functional content, an irrational belief with a demand and a dysfunctional content, a rational belief with a functional content and no preference, and an irrational belief with a dysfunctional content and no demand. Participants imagined themselves holding their belief in an imaginary context, whilst rating the extent of their agreement to 14 functional and dysfunctional inferences. Contrary to REBT theory, results indicated that rational and irrational beliefs had the same magnitude of effect on the functionality of inferences, whether they referred to a preference/demand+contents, or only contents. The discussion maintains that preferences and demands may not constitute the principal mechanism through which rational and irrational beliefs affect the functionality of inferences. Instead, consistent with Beck's cognitive therapy, belief contents may constitute this primary mechanism.

Let's start from scratch in thinking about what memory is for, and consequently, how it works. Suppose that memory and conceptualization work in the service of perception and action. In this case, conceptualization is the encoding of patterns of possible physical interaction with a three-dimensional world. These patterns are constrained by the structure of the environment, the structure of our bodies, and memory. Thus, how we perceive and conceive of the environment is determined by the types of bodies we have. Such a memory would not have associations. Instead, how concepts become related (and what it means to be related) is determined by how separate patterns of actions can be combined given the constraints of our bodies. I call this combination “mesh.” To avoid hallucination, conceptualization would normally be driven by the environment, and patterns of action from memory would play a supporting, but automatic, role. A significant human skill is learning to suppress the overriding contribution of the environment to conceptualization, thereby allowing memory to guide conceptualization. The effort used in suppressing input from the environment pays off by allowing prediction, recollective memory, and language comprehension. I review theoretical work in cognitive science and empirical work in memory and language comprehension that suggest that it may be possible to investigate connections between topics as disparate as infantile amnesia and mental-model theory.