Chapter 9 takes a closer look at how the party-state maintained control through village level case studies in Tigray – where the EPRDF’s hegemonic development project came closest to realisation – and Oromiya – where EPRDF control was most contested. The EPRDF utilised a combination of symbolic, distributive and coercive powers channelled through an increasingly elaborate and extensive party-state infrastructure to secure mass acquiescence. In particular, the chapter highlights that the party-state established control over the distribution of almost every necessary livelihood resource – including land, agricultural inputs, credit and social protection – effectively routing the survival strategies of the population through party-state structures. However, the distributive failings outlined in previous chapters – notably the shortage of land and employment – also exposed the limits of political control. The party-state had increasingly little to offer in terms of livelihoods for young adults, with the result that younger generations tended to have much weaker ties to the regime and increasingly escaped this strategy of enmeshment.

This chapter starts with the central puzzle of this book: Why do governments choose blunt force regulation to control pollution when more reasonable, sustainable solutions are possible? It proposes that governments choose this suboptimal approach because they seek, first and foremost, to overcome principal–agent problems within the state apparatus. Drawing on case research and interviews with government officials around China, this chapter illustrates how blunt force regulation creates shortcuts that allow political leaders to increase the credible threat of punishment towards noncompliant bureaucrats. These measures temporarily scare local authorities into enforcing policies as ordered, even after prolonged periods of noncompliance. Finally, this chapter offers some observable implications for this theory, which will be tested in ensuing chapters.

This chapter broadens the scope of the analysis to assess whether blunt force regulation is unique to China. It reveals that blunt force regulation is a widespread political phenomenon found in both advanced industrial environments (like the UK) and weak institutional environments (like India and the Philippines). When political leaders confront urgent or overwhelming enforcement problems, they sometimes resort to unreasonable, one-size-fits-all measures to ensure that enforcement actions are effective. Through analyzing these cases, this chapter concludes that blunt force regulation is one of a set of potential responses to the inevitable principal–agent problems of regulation. However, the character of blunt force regulation – including how forceful or indiscriminate it is – is shaped by institutional features such as a state’s resource capabilities and coercive capacity.

After the war with Iraq (1980–1988), Iran had to reconstruct the economy and the government’s public management systems to address mounting challenges of urban poverty, low economic growth, and poor local management, which had led to significant urban unrest in several cities. The technocratic response of the Rafsanjani administration (1989–1997) included tentative steps to decentralize some central government functions to municipalities and a mandate for them to become financially self-sufficient. The technocrats supported decentralization for instrumental or pragmatic reasons of increasing the efficiency of local administration, not for empowering local democracy. I interpret the tensions between the competing imperatives of the Iranian decision to decentralize by distinguishing two ways a state can be strong, or between what I call good and bad centralization. In so doing, I draw on the distinction of two types of power introduced by Michael Mann, “infrastructural” power – the power of states to achieve collective purposes – and “despotic” power – the capacity of government to exert power over society and individuals. While both authoritarian and democratic states seek to augment the former, authoritarian states depend on strengthening the latter. By their indifference to the goal of checking despotic power, the technocratic endorsement of decentralization worked against democratization and dovetailed with the velayi goal of augmenting both forms of power together toward the goal of Islamizing society and state. At the same time, the failure to promote local economic development through decentralization must be considered a failure of the technocratic agenda.

Analysis in this chapter supports an overall trend of decline in the percentage of polluted days since 2012. Yet, stricter and more centralized policy enforcement measures do not have truly significant, across-the-board effects in reducing pollution in China, and the fall in PM2.5 concentration has not translated into significant and sustained health benefits. The chapter also examines the success and failure of the government in tracking the ongoing targets it set for achieving final policy goals, paying special attention to the following issue areas: reduction of toxic emissions, attacking water pollution, energy, and industrial restructuring, policy coordination, public participation, and the use of market mechanisms. The mixed outcome in addressing air pollution highlights the constraints and flaws of China’s environmental governance model. It also suggests that decades of reform and opening up have not fundamentally changed the impromptu, non-participatory, unaccountable, and mobilizational policy process, which often leads to undesirable and unintended policy outcomes.